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This article discusses the current global financial crisis and its implications for international
finance and financial regulation. The article begins with a discussion of the causes of the crisis,
particularly the role of regulatory incentives underlying excessive international and domestic bor-
rowing, lending, and investment. From this basis, the article looks to the international responses to
the crisis, focusing on the Financial Stability Forum and the Group of Twenty. In this context, it
considers issues relating to systemic risk and financial stability, with particular attention to possible
regulatory changes and their implications for international finance.
I. Introduction
During 2008, for the first time since the 1930s, the world economy experienced a sys-
temic financial crisis: on September 18, the international financial system was on the prec-
ipice of collapse, and global credit markets essentially ceased to function for the following
four weeks. While the ultimate economic impact of this financial crisis-the Global
Credit Crisis of 2008-is still unknown, following a series of dramatic events including
the failure of major financial institutions and significant government interventions in fi-
nancial systems around the world, it is now unlikely that either the global or any major
domestic financial system will collapse, causing the onset of an economic depression of the
sort unseen since the 1930s. The causes of the global credit crisis are now generally un-
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derstood, however, and major initiatives are underway around the world to reform finan-
cial regulation, with far reaching consequences for the future of global finance.
In essence, the credit crisis resulted from an unprecedented period of excessive borrow-
ing, excessive lending, and excessive investment incentivized by a series of significant eco-
nomic and regulatory factors. Excessive borrowing and lending most directly arose in the
context of the market for subprime residential mortgages in the United States, especially
during 2005 and 2006. Excessive borrowing and lending, however, were also prevalent in
virtually all asset classes globally, including commercial real estate, corporate lending (es-
pecially for mergers and acquisitions and private equity transactions), commodities, and
international (especially emerging markets) equities. These excesses were not limited to
the United States; they were truly global, impacting almost every market and asset class.
This broad-based excessive borrowing and lending was fueled by excessive investment
from a wide range of investors around the world.
Excessive borrowing, lending, and investment were inextricably interconnected through
a range of transaction structures derived from well understood techniques of securitiza-
tion. Essentially, securitization is a transaction structure in which loans (such as loans
secured by residential real estate, i.e., mortgages) are pooled together ("repackaged") as
collateral underlying the issuance of securities, predominantly debt securities.' Securitiza-
ton allows originators (such as banks) of assets (such as residential mortgages) to trans-
form a future stream of revenue (i.e., loan repayments) into a present value pool of capital,
which can then be used to support further lending. In order to be effective, this process
requires investors willing to purchase the resulting securities. In the typical transaction
structure, the collateral is transferred to a separate legal entity-a special purpose vehicle
(SPV)-which in turn issues the securities purchased by investors and uses the proceeds
from the sale of securities to purchase the pool of collateral from the originator. This
structure is the most commonly used structure in the United States and in other common
law countries around the world. In civil law countries (especially in continental Europe),
the norm has been for the bank to issue the securities directly with the backing of a legally
isolated pool of collateral-"covered bonds."
2
At its simplest, securitization makes a great deal of sense: it allows the distribution of
risks to a wider pool of investors, thereby reducing the cost of borrowing for ultimate
borrowers and reducing the risk to lenders of defaults on underlying loans.3 At the same
time, however, the structure has the potential to provide significant incentives to abuse,
and this quality, in many ways, lies at the heart of the current credit crisis. Especially in
the United States and the United Kingdom, loans came to be made not by banks with an
on-going interest in their repayment, but instead by specialists-mortgage brokers for real
estate and a range of financial institutions, especially investment banks, for corporate
loans-intent on profiting from charging to arrange loans and not on maintaining an
interest in the ability of the borrower to repay in the future.
1. See Douglas Arner, Emerging Market Economies and Government Promotion of Securitization, 12 DuKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 505, 505 (2002) [hereinafter Emerging Markets].
2. The key difference between covered bonds and securitized transactions is that covered bonds remain on
the issuer's consolidated balance sheet. See Douglas W. Arner, Paul Lejot & Lotte Schou-Zibell, The Global
Credit Crisis and Securitisation in East Asia, 3 CAPI. MARKETS L. J. 291, 299 (2008).
3. See id; See also Emerging Markets, supra note 1.
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Securitization was thus the central linkage between excessive investment in credit secur-
ities and excessive borrowing and lending. Excessive investment was largely the result of
two economic factors: first, the period of low interest rates in Japan after the onset of its
banking crisis at the beginning of the 1990s and in the United States following the burst-
ing of the dot.com bubble in 2001; and second, the imbalances in saving and investment
between the Anglo-American economies, especially the United States and United King-
dom, and the rest of the world, especially Japan, China, and major oil-producing countries
such as Russia and Saudi Arabia. 4 The combination of low interest rates and large
volumes of investment funds from outside the United States and the United Kingdom
supported massive investment in debt securities in New York and London designed to
produce an appealing combination of perceived safety and attractive yields.5
In addition to issues that arose in the context of relatively simple securitization transac-
tions, the technology of securitization was expanded over the past decade to encompass a
range of ever-more complex techniques and structures, including structured investment
vehicles (SIVs) and conduits, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), collateralized loan
obligations (CLOs), synthetic securitizations, and a range of other exotics such as CDO
squared and synthetic CDOs. Many of these took the technology of securitization (pool-
ing of risks, off-balance sheet structure, capital markets funding) and combined it with
that of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, especially credit derivatives such as credit
default swaps (CDSs).6 Of these, probably the most significant are CDOs and CDSs.
4. See MARTIN WOLF, FIXING GLOBAL FINANCE (2008).
5. Perceived safety resulted both from a general failure to analyze risks appropriately and specifically from
rating agency failures. See Arner, Lejot & Schou-Zibell, spra note 2.
6. For discussion, see FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON
ErntANCING MARKET AND INSTrrUTIONAL RESILIENCE (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.fsforum.org/
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While the term CDO is in many ways generic and could easily describe any collateral-
ized security, such as residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), more generally the
term is applied to transactions that are essentially securitizations of a variety of other
securitized assets such as RMBS. Thus, at its simplest, a CDO may be a securitization of
securitizations. Often, however, a variety of other assets may be pooled with more tradi-
tional asset backed securities (ABS), most commonly CDSs.
Figure 2: Simplified CDO CDS 1
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A CDS is a bilateral derivative transaction, which may be seen as a type of protection
against default or as a synthetic loan.7 In essence the seller of a CDS agrees to pay the
buyer if a credit event, typically some sort of default by an unrelated borrower, occurs.
The buyer of the CDS agrees to pay the seller a stream of payments roughly equivalent to
the payments that would be made by the identified but unrelated borrower. As such, the
seller of the CDS receives a stream of payments that mimic a loan-thus, for one party,
the CDS is a form of synthetic loan: a mechanism to acquire credit risk of an unrelated
party. If the notional creditor defaults, the seller must pay the value of the defaulted
obligation or deliver the underlying obligation to the buyer. The buyer in turn purchases
a form of protection against the default of the underlying borrower/obligation, thereby
hedging an actual credit to the notional borrower or speculating on notional credit risk.
As such, a CDS can be used instead of actual assets (such as mortgage loans) in the context
publications/r_0804.pdf hereinafter Financial Stability Forum; BANK oF ENGLAND, FINANCIAL STABILITY RE-
PORT (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2008/fsrfull0810.pdf; FINAN-
CIAL SERVICES AuTHoRrrx, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING
CRIsis (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.
7. See BERRY HsU, DOUGLAS ARNER, K. S. TSE & SYREN JOHNsTONE, Financial Markets in Hong
Kong: Law and Practice CH. 6 (2006).
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of a CDO. In addition, a CDS could be used to protect against default on underlying
assets in the context of an ABS or CDO structure.
Figure 3: Credit default swap (CDS) Bank B: Protection seller
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While such transaction structures in hindsight may seem an obvious source of risk, in
fact, in the period leading up to the global credit crisis, such techniques received impor-
tant support and developmental incentives from regulators around the world, especially
through the internationally developed and globally implemented Basel Capital Accords. s
This combination of debt capital market technology, regulatory incentives, excessively low
interest rates, and massive global investor demand set the stage for the crisis.
By the end of 2006, real estate prices in the United States and a range of other Western
countries had reached unsustainable levels.9 As central banks around the world began to
raise interest rates to address potential inflationary concerns resulting from rapid global
economic growth, weaker residential mortgage borrowers in the United States began to
have difficulties meeting their obligations, and defaults on loans began to increase. At the
same time, as new purchasers stopped entering the markets, real estate prices began to
decrease rapidly, triggering a downward spiral that ultimately impacted all asset classes
except U.S., Japanese, and German government bonds and led ultimately to the systemic
crisis in the U.S. and global financial systems of September and October 2008.
This process, triggered by peaks in residential mortgage markets and growing defaults,
was rapidly transmitted through the structures of securitization throughout the financial
system. At the initial stage, market participants began to question who would be impacted
by residential real estate price decreases and increasing defaults on subprime loans. His-
torically, in previous real estate crises, banks that had made the loans were expected to feel
the impact.' 0 Due to securitization, however, banks no longer owned the underlying
8. See Arner, Lejot & Schou-Zibell, rupra note 2.
9. See WOLF, supra note 4; Financial Stability Forum, supra note 6.
10. See C14ARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANcIa. CRISES
(4th ed. 2000).
SPRING 2009
96 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
loans, and the question arose as to who in fact owned the securities that were becoming
impaired. This confusion brought a classic case of adverse selection: because no one knew
who owned the loans (as a result of their repackaging and re-repackaging into CDOs,
etc.), markets ceased to deal in instruments the values of which were now uncertain. In
addition, throughout the first half of 2007, investor preferences changed from high-yield
credit products to simpler investments, such as emerging market equities and commodi-
ties. I I As markets for complex debt securities ceased to function due to adverse selection
and changes in investor preferences, markets began to lose confidence in those firms that
had been very active in these markets, realizing that as the music ceased, they were likely
to be found holding large amounts of impaired and now unmarketable loans and securi-
ties. Institutions such as Northern Rock in the United Kingdom and Bear Stearns in the
United States found themselves unable to fund their continuing operations, eventually
requiring resolution through government intervention.
Following the demise of Bear Stearns in March 2008, market confidence continued to
deteriorate, with financial institutions increasingly wary of dealing with one another, even
in the context of short-term interbank borrowing and lending. At the same time, markets
began to scrutinize institutions viewed as heavily exposed, such as monoline insurance
companies, which provided credit support in the context of securitizations and CDOs;
investment banks such as Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch; mortgage lenders such as
Washington Mutual (WaMu) and Hypo Real Estate; quasi-public mortgage market insti-
tutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; CDS providers such as AIG; and banking
groups that had most actively pursued the originate-and-distribute model of business such
as Citigroup, UBS, and Royal Bank of Scotland. 12 In each of these cases, potential sys-
temic risk existed.
Systemic risk is defined as:
the risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and
attendant increases in uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial system
that is serious enough to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real
economy. Systemic risk events can be sudden and unexpected, or the likelihood of
their occurrence can build up through time in the absence of appropriate policy re-
sponses. The adverse real economic effects from systemic problems are generally
seen as arising from disruptions to the payment system, to credit flows, and from the
destruction of asset values. 13
While in each case there was potential systemic risk, it was the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers on September 15, 2008, that finally triggered a systemic financial crisis in the
United States, causing "a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases
in uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial system that [was] serious
enough to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy" 14 that
triggered the global systemic financial crisis of autumn 2008.
11. See WOLF, supra note 4; Financial Stability Forum, supra note 6.
12. See Arner, Lejot & Schou-Zibell, supra note 5.
13. GROUP OF TEN, CONSOLIDATION IN THE FNANCLc SECTOR 126-127 (Bank for Int'l Settlements
2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gtenOSch3.pdf.
14. Id. at 126.
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As a result of the crisis, the governments of the United States, the European Union, and
Switzerland, among others, were forced to intervene dramatically in order to prevent the
systemic financial crisis from becoming a systemic financial collapse. These governments
intervened through, among other things, interest rate cuts, massive liquidity infusions,
capital injections, guarantees, and asset purchases. These actions, while sufficient to pre-
vent the collapse of the global financial system and most domestic financial systems (Ice-
land being the exception), were not sufficient to prevent major adverse economic
consequences, albeit less severe to date than those of the 1930s. In addition, the systemic
financial crisis has highlighted the need for significant changes in both domestic and
global financial regulation to prevent future systemic financial crises.
Following this introduction, this article first discusses the background to and causes of
the financial crisis, focusing on significant legal and regulatory factors (Section If). In
section III, the article reviews the initial events involving systcmic risk and the responses
thereto. Section IV discusses international responses to improve financial regulation to
prevent future crises. Finally, section V concludes with a brief discussion of possible im-
plications for the future of global finance.
II. Background and Causes
As is often the case with financial crises,' 5 many of the underlying factors leading to the
global credit crisis of 2008 arose from responses to previous crises. In this case, certain
underlying factors date as far back as the design of the U.S. financial regulatory system
during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The most important elements, however, de-
veloped primarily from reactions in the 1980s and 1990s to the developing country debt
crisis of the 1980s and the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s.
A. 1929-1983: BACKGROUND
One of the underlying causes of the global credit crisis of 2008 was a divergence be-
tween domestic regulatory structures and the realities of global finance. This divergence
was most acutely felt in the United States but was also seen in problems that emerged in
the countries of the European Union among others.
In the context of the United States, one must look back to the previous major systemic
financial crisis and resultant economic collapse: the 1920s and the Great Depression of the
1930s. The 1920s was a period of then unprecedented optimism and economic growth in
the United States. It was also a period of financial excess, especially over-borrowing,
over-lending, and over-investment. Unlike the 2000s, these excesses focused on the stock
market and culminated in the Great Crash of 1929.16 The dramatic increase in stock
prices in the 1920s had been underpinned by large amounts of lending for stock
purchases. With the dramatic decline of 1929, lenders called in loans and borrowers were
forced to sell assets-stock, property, bonds, etc.-to repay loans, triggering a further
15. See FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE 1990s: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Douglas Arner, Mamiko Yokoi-Arai &
Zhongfei Zhou eds., 2002).
16. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRATRH, THE GREAT CRASH OF 1929 (1954); MILTON FRIEDMAN &
ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1971); KINDLEBERGER,
supra note 10.
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decline in asset prices, further margin calls, and massive deleveraging. 17 This process
caused widespread losses to market participants and lenders, resulting in losses of confi-
dence in markets and among market participants, consequent bank failures, and collapses
in lending to businesses, consumption, and investment. Eventually, the process spiraled
into the huge economic collapse of the 1930s known as the Great Depression. The newly
elected Roosevelt administration responded with the New Deal legislation, but ultimately
it was the economic stimulus provided by World War II that finally brought the United
States out of the Great Depression.Is
The financial response, however, differed dramatically from the response to the current
crisis: instead of government intervention at an early stage, the Hoover administration
focused on market-based solutions, closing banks, liquidating firms, real estate, farmers,
etc. It was in many ways the response to the financial shock that ensured that the eco-
nomic consequences would be severe.' 9
In addition to its economic interventions, the Roosevelt administration also initiated the
wholesale redesign of the U.S. financial system through legislation and regulation de-
signed to: (1) prevent the sorts of excesses seen in the 1920s; (2) reduce the risks of future
financial crises becoming systemic; and (3) ensure that the financial system supported eco-
nomic growth rather than speculation.2 0
The Roosevelt financial system was based on a series of legislation designed to address
all aspects of the U.S. financial system. Essentially, this legislative package established a
financial system divided into banking, securities, and insurance sectors, with the intention
of reducing contagious risks and excesses that seemingly characterized the 1920s. 21 Policy
and financial matters would be coordinated in the government by the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Treasury Department. The Federal Reserve System, established in the
wake of the Bankers' Panic of 1907, would be reinforced in its dual role of focusing on the
sometimes conflicting objectives of monetary stability and full employment. 22
Building on the existing framework established in the wake of the previous global sys-
temic crisis of the 1870s, the banking sector would be regulated at both the state and
federal level, with state banks regulated at the state level and national banks regulated by
the Treasury's Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 23. Significantly, the Glass-Stea-
gall Act banned banks from participating in non-banking activities. Supporting the regu-
latory framework, a system of deposit insurance and bank insolvency resolution was
17. See GALBRAITH, supra note 16.
18. Id.
19. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH OF 1929 (1954); MILTON FRIEDMAN &
ANNA JACOBSON ScHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1971); KiNDLEBERGER,
supra note 10.
20. See generally U.S. TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE
(2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf [hereinafter Treasury Blue-
print]; See also CHRISTOPHER D. OLIVE & DOUGLAS ARNER, Sectoral Regulation: Financial Services Moderni-
zation in the US and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, in FINANCIAL REGULATION-A GUIDE TO STRUC-
TURAL REFORM CH. 5 (Douglas Amer & Jan-Juy Lin eds., 2003) [hereinafter Olive & Arner].
21. See Treasury Blueprint, supra note 20.
22. See FEDERAL RESERVE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYsTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS (2005) [herein-
after Federal Reserve].
23. For the best discussion of the development of banking and banking law in the United States, see MARK
J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (2d ed.
1994).
VOL. 43, NO. 1
GLOBAL CREDIT CRISIS 2008 99
established at a federal level through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).24 In addition, a range of home finance agencies were established to support
broad-based individual home ownership, including the Federal Housing Association, the
Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).25
The securities sector was to be primarily regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) under the various securities laws.2 6 The term "investment bank" re-
sulted from the division of existing financial conglomerates into banks, securities firms
(investment banks), and insurance companies. In addition, state securities regulators were
to continue their regulation activities within their respective states. 2 7 Matters relating to
accounting were also placed within the purview of the SEC.28 Insurance matters were left
purely to state law and state regulators.29
With certain changes, this regulatory system continues to exist. At the same time, how-
ever, the financial and economic environment in which it operates has changed com-
pletely, not least as a result of globalization, technology, and complexity. Prior to the
1980s, the most significant change to this design was the creation of the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to regulate commodities markets in 1974, follow-
ing a series of commodities related crises.30 Additionally, in 1975, the SEC ended the
previously existing system of fixed commissions for securities brokers ("May Day").31 Al-
though May Day reduced costs and increased competition, it eventually lead to the need
for investment banks to move into ever more risky areas of business in order to increase
profits. In addition, Fannie Mae was privatized in 1968 and joined by the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) in 1970. These two government sponsored
enterprises (GSEs), though explicitly not part of the U.S. government, were viewed by
markets as implicitly guaranteed by it.
As can be seen, the complexity of this system was certain to produce overlaps and gaps:
these were to be brought dramatically to light in 2008.
B. 1983-1998: LAYtNG THE FoUNDATIONS
In 1983, the global financial system experienced its next major episode of systemic risk,
but one that did not lead to a systemic crisis in international financial system: the Devel-
oping Country Debt Crisis. This crisis was the result of excessive lending and borrowing
by international banks and developing countries, fueled by massive deposits of oil revenue
24. The Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, created the FDIC to regulate participants in
the commercial bank deposit insurance system.
25. See Treasury Blueprint, supra note 20.
26. See generally MARc I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SEcuRTIEs LAW (4th ed. 2007).
27. See id.
28. See Marc I. Steinberg, Douglas W. Arner & Christopher D. Olive, The Development of Internationally
Acceptable Accounting Standards: A Universal Language for Finance in the 21st Century?, 27 SEc. REG. L. J. 324
(1999).
29. See Federal Reserve, supra note 22.
30. See id.
31. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HIsTORY OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (3d ed. 2003).
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from oil producing countries ("petrodollars").32 The crisis was triggered when interest
rates were raised dramatically in the United States to combat severe inflation that had
developed across the 1970s, leading to the inability of developing country borrowers to
meet their interest obligations, which were based on floating rates of interest in the con-
text of large syndicated loans among major international banks. These massive defaults
essentially destroyed the capital base of the world's largest international banks.
Most importantly for present purposes, the developing country debt crisis of the 1980s
led developed country governments (led by the United States and the United Kingdom) to
develop a new internationally agreed minimum capital standard, the Basel Capital Accord
of 1988. 33
1. The 1988 Basel Capital Accord
In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), hosted by
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), reached a secret agreement (subsequently
published) regarding an agreed approach among the Group of Ten (G-10) developed na-
tions concerning the regulation of bank capital of internationally active banks (1988 Basel
Accord).34 Although only intended to apply to internationally active G-10 banks, the
1988 Basel Capital Accord, in the following decade and a half, became the international
standard for bank capital regulation around the world and has been implemented through
formal domestic legal arrangements in more than 100 countries. 35 At its simplest, the
1988 Accord was intended to: (1) reduce systemic risk through requiring banks to hold a
minimum amount of capital against risks, and (2) limit regulatory competition and arbi-
trage, thereby providing a level playing field for internationally active banks. 36 In essence,
the first goal was a response to the problems that resulted from the 1980s debt crisis,
wherein large international banks made significant loans to developing countries, which
subsequently defaulted. These defaults raised a very real risk of an international systemic
banking crisis. Failure of the majority of the world's ten largest banks was only averted
through careful regulatory forbearance and financial restructuring efforts (for both the
international banks and their developing country borrowers) across the second half of the
1980s.
The 1988 Accord is a fairly simple framework, focusing on one aspect: capital in rela-
tion to credit risk in banks. At its heart is the equation that total capital divided by total
32. See THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CUSIS IN HISTOuICAL PERSPECTWVE (Barry Eichengreen & Peter H.
Linder eds., 1994).
33. See generally JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS
(1995). See also Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, The Role of the Bank for International Settlements in Shaping the
World Financial System, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 945 (2004); Duncan E. Alford, Bask Committee Interna-
tional Capital Adequacy Standards: Analysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 189
(1992).
34. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdfno
frames=l (hereinafter 1988 Basel Capital Accord).
35. For assessments, see International Monetary Fund [IMF], Reports on the Observance of Standards and
Codes, http://www.imforg/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp?sort=topic#BankingSupervision (last visited Apr. 6,
2009).
36. See 1988 Basel Capital Accord, supra note 34.
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risk-adjusted assets must equal at least 8 percent. 37 The simple definition has two major
components: (1) capital and (2) risk-adjusted assets. Under the 1988 framework, capital is
divided into two forms: Tier 1 and Tier 2, of which Tier 1 capital must make up at least 50
percent of total capital. 38 Tier 1 capital is essentially shareholder equity, while Tier 2
capital includes a variety of forms of subordinated debt.
Total-risk adjusted assets are primarily composed of a bank's loan portfolio. Loans (and
related debt instruments) are grouped into four "baskets": Category 1, Category 2, Cate-
gory 3, and Category 4.39 Each category very loosely groups together different forms of
obligations based on simple risk classifications and assigns a weighting to those assets:
Category 1: Primarily Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) country and local government securities-0 percent,
Category 2: Primarily interbank claims-20 percent,
Category 3: Primarily debt secured by real property-50 percent,
Category 4: All other obligations, including, most importantly, private sector corpo-
rate debt-100 percent. 40
In addition to primary assets (e.g., loans), the 1988 Accord also provides mechanisms for
drawing certain otherwise off-balance sheet obligations into total risk-adjusted assets for
purposes of capital. Once again, off-balance sheet obligations are grouped into four bas-
kets, each with a different conversion factor: 100 percent, 50 percent, 20 percent, and 0
percent. 41
Overall, this simple framework, while not very precise in term of risk calculation, pro-
vides a central element of bank regulation for the majority of economies around the world.
It also provided, perhaps, the major incentive to the development of the originate and
distribute model of finance that, when taken to excess, has subsequently come to be seen
as one of the most significant underlying causes of the global credit crisis of 2008.
2. Regulatory Origins of Securitization
Increasingly harmonized capital regulation, which created strong transaction incentives
among both bank originators and bank investors, has driven bank demand for securitiza-
tion since the late 1980s. This form of capital regulation created potential value and the
enabling devices for securitization to reduce transaction costs. Just as transaction costs are
regarded by institutional economists as the catalyst for the transformation of firms as eco-
nomic organizations, so regulation has a similar effect among financial intermediaries. In
recent years, this fact seems also to have been magnified, with intense transaction use
spread among a broadening population of banks. In terms of transnational commercial
law, securitization by capital-regulated intermediaries has arguably been an intrinsic part
of the Basel process.
The 1988 Accord's application of banded weightings to loans and other risk assets-
together with standard capital provisioning and the creation of distinct tiers of regulatory
37. Id. at para. 44.
38. Id. at para. 14.
39. Id. at para. 22.
40. Id. at Annex 2.
41. Id. at Annex 3.
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capital-immediately became critical in credit preferences, although not in overall credit
creation. Capital-intensive instruments, such as committed stand-by lines of credit,
quickly lost favor, especially where competition eroded compensation for such lines.
Banks that had formerly targeted net returns on assets as a measure of operating perform-
ance found that peer pressure made it essential to manage the accumulation of risk and
both actual and regulatory capital according to a series of metrics, including returns on
risk-adjusted assets, and on the component layers of regulatory capital set by the Basel
Committee.
The result was a profound effect on transaction costs and an encouragement for many
firms to separate credit origination from considerations of risk accumulation. It thus
helped intensify the rewards of active organizational and balance sheet management. The
1988 Accord also induced portfolio arbitrage and credit distortions in order to reinforce
the development of securitization and credit risk transfer markets. 42 Securitization and
credit risk transfer can thus be seen as secondary results of harmonized regulatory princi-
ples and a substantial explanation of securitization and other forms of credit risk transfer
developed by banks since the late 1980s.
As the 1988 Accord created incentives for both systemic and transactional arbitrage, 4 3
the emphasis in bank securitization changed from elective strategy to regulatory arbitrage.
Not only did the introduction of the first capital accord cause banks to manage their credit
portfolios to meet regulatory incentives, making securitization a commonly used tool, it
also acquainted many investor classes with both securitized transactions and regulatory
capital instruments.
3. Consequences for Debt Capital Markets
In addition to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, the 1980s debt crisis also triggered two
major behavioral changes in debt capital markets, largely because the crisis had emanated
from large syndicated loans. In the aftermath of the crisis, banks began trading loans
originating from developing country syndicated loans.44 This loan trading constituted the
beginning of a major conceptual shift in banking: a bank could make a loan to a borrower
but did not necessarily have to hold the loan to term. Rather, loans could be bought and
sold amongst first banks and then other financial institutions such as investment funds.
Additionally, because banks had lost money as a result of defaults on syndicated loans,
they became increasingly interested in bond markets, wherein they could originate loans
(and charge fees for arranging the financing) then sell on the risk to a range of investors
around the world. The banks were thus insulated from potential defaults. In addition, the
eventual resolution program (Brady bonds) relied on securitization techniques, which con-
sequently became more widely known and accepted.
4 5
This trend was further reinforced by experiences in the U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis of
the 1980s. In the late 1980s, the U.S. savings and loan (S&L), or thrift industry, which
42. See Andreas Jobst, The Regulatory Treatment of Asset Securitisation: The Basel Securitisation Framework
Erplained, 13 J. FINs. REc. & COMPLIANCE 15 (2005).
43. Which Basel II in part aims to remove. See id.
44. See Ross P. BUCKLEY, Emerging Markets Debt: An Analysis of the Secondary Market (1999).
45. See id.
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had been created in the late 1800s to support local saving and lending, essentially failed. 46
As part of the New Deal legislation in the 1930s, the S&L industry became highly regu-
lated in terms of deposit and lending rates and opportunities, being essentially limited to
residential real estate. In the late 1970s, these institutions were substantially deregulated
and allowed to engage in a much wider range of business, largely similar to that of com-
mercial banks. During the 1980s, S&Ls expanded lending dramatically; however, it ter-
minated at the end of the decade with real estate price declines and widespread S&L
failures.47
Of present importance, securitization was widely used as a tool in the resolution of
failed S&Ls by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC),4s thereby reinforcing under-
standing and acceptance of resulting securities.
The further impact of modem transaction technology and capital regulation was to
steadily encourage the prolific transfer of credit risk to hedge funds and other lightly-
regulated intermediaries and encourage the creation of SIVs and investment conduits de-
signed to maximize the returns from capital and accounting arbitrage. In the past decade,
this behavior, in turn, has influenced the nature, composition, and funding of all bank risk
assets and has radically altered the use of structured finance techniques by many banks,
especially an elite group of major banks that is most committed to structured finance and
risk management and that represents a powerful participatory lobby in the Basel process.
4. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998
Caused largely by improperly designed regulatory systems supporting overinvestment
in real estate, the Asian financial crisis fundamentally laid the foundations of the global
financial imbalances that fueled the global credit crisis of 2007-2008. Specifically, Asian
countries faced a series of currency, financial, and economic crises that forced them to
turn to international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for
assistance, assistance that came with very economically and politically unpleasant strings
derived from the Washington Consensus economic policies. 49 As a result of the crisis,
Asian countries and other emerging market countries, including Japan, South Korea,
China, and, eventually, India, Russia, and Brazil, among others, concluded that the best
prevention in the future against any currency, financial, and economic crises was export-
led growth supported by undervalued currencies and massive accumulation of foreign ex-
change reserves.50 Export-led growth in turn relied on consumption primarily in the
United States, with consumer lending supported through low interest rates maintained
through investment of large portions of foreign exchange reserves resulting from exports
in U.S. government and agency securities.
46. See THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRisis: LESSONS FROM A REGULATORY FAILURE (James R. Barth, Su-
sanne Trimbath & Glenn Yago eds., 2004).
47. See id.
48. Established by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Star. 183.
49. See DOUGLAS W. ARN-ER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF LAW
(2007); Arner, Yokoi-Arai & Zhou, supra note 15.
50. See Wolf, supra note 4. See also Douglas Aner, Paul Lejot & Wei Wang, Assessing East Asian Financial
Cooperation and Integration, SINGAPORE Y.B. IJT'L L. (forthcoming 2009).
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5. The Collapse of LTCM
In many ways, the final episode of the Asian financial crisis was a serious domestic
financial crisis in Russia in August 1998, which, in turn, caused the near failure of the
world's largest and most famous hedge fund: Long Term Capital Management (LTCM).5 1
The U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve, viewing LTCM's collapse as a potential systemic
risk, organized a private sector bailout of the firm by a series of the world's largest finan-
cial institutions.52 While the firms involved eventually profited significantly, there were
two unintended consequences. First, financial market participants came to believe that
the U.S. Federal Reserve would not allow a systemically important financial institution
(even an unregulated firm such as a hedge fund) to fail, and second, regulators came to
believe that the key systemic risks lay not in the regulated institutions but in unregulated
investment firms such as hedge funds.
C. 1998-2004: A NEW MODEL?
By the end of the 1990s, this series of underlying events led to the view that a new
model of banking had emerged. This model was based on several elements, most impor-
tandy universal banking and the originate and distribute business model, both of which
received important support from international financial regulatory standards.
1. The New Model: Universal Banking and Originate and Distribute
Unlike the system of finance established in the United States in the 1930s, the new
model of finance was based on a European-style model of universal banking rather than
on the U.S. New Deal's strict sectoral separation.5 3
This aspect was secured with the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999 through the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1998 (GLBA).54 As a result of this change,
competition between commercial banks and investment banks for securities business in-
creased dramatically, forcing the investment banks into ever more risky reliance on pro-
prietary trading-speculating with their own capital and using leverage to increase returns.
Second, the model was based on securitization, now termed the "originate and dis-
tribute" model.55 Under the originate and distribute model, financial institutions would
originate assets, such as loans, and then repackage these and sell them to investors. The
resulting funds would be used to originate more assets, which in turn would be repackaged
and sold, recommencing the cycle. From the standpoint of financial institutions, this
model had two benefits. First, it increased profitability by increasing the velocity of trans-
actions that in a low interest rate environment relied more on fees charged for origination
51. For more information on LTCM, its near failure, its subsequent recapitalization and implications for
dealing with systemic risk in the United States, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESPONSES TO QUES-
TIONS CONCERNING LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND RELATED EVEsNTs, GGD-00-67R (2000),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ggOO067r.pdf [hereinafter GAO Responses]; U.S. GEN. Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, Long-Term Capital Management: Regulators Need to Focus Greater Attention on Sys-
temic Risk, GGD-00-3 (1999).
52. See GAO Responses, supra note 51.
53. See FINANCIAL REGULATION-A GUiDE TO STRUCTURAL REFORM (Douglas Arner & Jan-Juy Lin
eds., 2003).
54. See Olive & Arner, supra note 20.
55. See Amer, Lejot & Schou-Zibell, supra note 2.
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than on spread-based income produced over the life of the asset. Second, it reduced risks
of any potential defaults because the originators did not own the assets originated; instead,
the resulting securities were widely distributed in the markets. From the standpoint of
regulators, this model likewise had two benefits. First, banks were less risky because they
were holding fewer loans and hence were exposed less to default risk in any future eco-
nomic downturn. Second, repackaging and distributing credit risks widely into the market
brought down the charges that lenders had to charge borrowers, increasing home owner-
ship and economic activity. Unfortunately, these benefits, when taken to excess, also
turned out to be the greatest weakness of the new model.
2. Regulatory Reinforcement of the New Model
Importantly, international regulatory changes provided significant incentives for these
changes. In the context of international capital standards, over time and in reaction to
various international banking crises, the 1988 Accord was modified in certain significant
ways through a variety of "amendments." Of most significance are four amendments.
First, the Accord was amended in July 1994 to redefine countries that can qualify for
OECD weighting, disqualifying countries that have rescheduled external debt within the
previous five years.56 This amendment was a specific reaction to the Mexican financial
crisis of 1994. (Mexico had immediately prior to the crisis become an OECD member, a
factor that incentivised international lending.)s 7 This amendment reinforced procyclical
effects of the Accord in encouraging lending to emerging market OECD members but
dramatically reducing it following any restructuring.
Second, the Accord was amended in April 1995 to recognize netting in the treatment of
off-balance sheet items.5 8 This amendment was a regulatory recognition of the develop-
ment of OTC swap markets during the 1980s and 1990s. Specifically, regulatory recogni-
tion of netting underpinned netting as one of the banks' most significant tools to reduce
counterparty credit risk exposures. This move towards collateralization of counterparty
risks through marketable securities accelerated in the wake of the failure of LTCM. Un-
fortunately, however, the premise rested on two assumptions: (1) that collateral can be
valued and (2) that collateral can be sold (i.e. that the securities are liquid). Both assump-
tions were to fail in 2008 for the majority of collateral.
Third, the Capital Accord was amended in January 1996, and modified in September
1997, to incorporate market risks.59 Previously, the 1988 Accord only dealt with credit
(i.e. counterparty) risk. But following the failure of Barings Bank in 1995, regulators be-
came acutely aware of banks' exposures to securities activities and therefore moved to
address such risks ("market risk") through two alternative approaches: a standardized ap-
proach and an internal models-based approach. The internal models-based approach al-
lowed banks to develop their own internal quantitative models to determine capital to be
56. BASEL COMMrTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO TIE 1988 CAPITAL ACCORD REC-
OGNrIION OF COLLATERAL (1994), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl4a.pdf?noframes=l.
57. See Douglas W. Arner, The Mexican Peso Crisis: Implications for the Regulation of Financial Markets, 4
LAW & Bus.REv. AM. 28, 28-69 (1996) [hereinafter Mexican Peso Crisis].
58. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL ACCORD: TREATMENT OF POTENTIAL Expo-
SURE FOR OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMs (1995), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl8.pdo. noframes=1.
59. BASEL COMMLI-rTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPrTAL ACCORD TO INCOR-
PORATE MARKET RIsKs (1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pd.noframes=l.
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held against market risks. Regulators believed such models (especially those of the largest
and most sophisticated banks), based on proprietary mathematical structures derived from
modern finance and other disciplines such as physics, to be superior to any possible regu-
latory standard. While the failure of LTCM tested excessive reliance on quantitative
modeling, regulators continued to allow banks to hold capital for market risks solely on
the basis of their own internal models.
Fourth, the Accord was amended in April 1998 to reduce the risk weighing for claims
on regulated securities firms, subject to certain conditions, and substituted "loans" for
"claims" in parts of the text.60 Essentially, the view was that by the end of the 1990s,
securities firms (especially the major international investment banks) had become suffi-
ciently regulated to merit similar treatment as banks in the context of capital requirements
relating to interbank lending. As a result, securities firms (and major financial center
banks) came to rely ever more heavily on short-term interbank funding, money market
funding, and capital market funding mechanisms rather than on traditional deposits.
These changes also had important consequences for investment banks. Traditionally,
investment banks had relied on advisory, fee-based transaction arrangements and ad-
vice-'merchant banking." 61 This sort of business is relatively low risk because the finan-
cial institution is not putting its own capital at risk. Following World War II, this business
was bolstered with the addition of brokerage, which until 1975 was highly profitable and
low risk in the context of a system of fixed commissions. 62 Following May Day and the
gradual encroachment of commercial banks into traditional investment banking business
(in which they were bolstered by availability of deposits and interbank financing), espe-
cially in the wake of the repeal of Glass-Steagall, investment banks found that in order to
maintain and increase profitability, they had to have access to their own capital (hence the
rush to list across the 1990s) and that they had to put their capital at risk, especially
through proprietary trading in the late 1990s and increasing leverage prior to 2008.
The combination of proprietary trading, leverage, and the originate and distribute
model would prove toxic to many of the largest, most famous and seemingly most sophis-
ticated international financial institutions in 2008.
D. 2005-2006: TAKING IT TO EXCESS AND THE ROLE OF BASEL II
As is invariably the case in finance, reasonable ideas were eventually taken to excess and
resulted in crisis. 63 In this case, the period of greatest excess was 2005-2006. During this
period, borrowers, lenders, arrangers of transactions, credit support providers such as in-
surance companies, investors, and advisors such as rating agencies all came together in an
environment of low interest rates, freely available capital, and regulatory distraction to
produce the greatest financial crisis since the 1930s. During this period, consumer lend-
ing and borrowing in the United States and United Kingdom (among others) reached new
levels of excess, with borrowers of lesser credit quality (including the now infamous sub-
60. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD (1998),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs36.pdfnoframes=l.
61. See Roy C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, GLOBAL BANKING (2d ed. 2003); STEPHEN VALDEZ, AN INTrRO-
DuJCnON TO GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (5th ed. 2007).
62. See SELIGMAN, supra note 31; SMITH & WALTER, supra note 61.
63. See KINDLEBERGFR, supra note 10.
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prime lending in the United States, of which the most extreme example was in the form of
"NINJA" borrowers-no income, no job, or no assets). Commercial lending for real es-
tate, M&A, and private equity propelled markets to new heights. Investors pursued yield
with little consideration for risk. Arrangers and advisors such as ratings agencies became
caught up in the fee generating orgy. At the same time, regulators, thinking originate and
distribute, on balance, was beneficial for financial stability and economic growth, focused
on other areas such as Basel II, hedge funds, and sovereign wealth funds.
1. Advanced Originate and Distribute
From the late 1990s, the majority of large international banks and investment banks
came to adopt the new model of originate and distribute universal banking. During the
2000s, this model was taken further, with the development of an essentially manufacturing
model of debt securities. 64 Under the manufacturing model, financial institutions would,
on a continual basis, either create or purchase underlying assets from other originators.
The assets would be pooled together into structured pools of risks designed to appeal to
various classes of investors and held. Such pooling would take place either on an on-
balance sheet or an off-balance sheet through separate, though often not truly indepen-
dent, entities such as conduits and SJVs. Pools, where necessary, would be supplemented
by synthetic credit risk through CDSs to meet the requirements of complex quantitative
models designed on the basis of portfolio theory to reduce risk and enhance return, in-
cluding those of ratings agencies.
Pools then would be used to back a structure of securities rated by external credit rat-
ings agencies. Resulting securities would be sold or held ("warehoused") depending on
prevailing market conditions, with purchasers including banks and investment banks (both
of which viewed highly rated securities as desirable investments and also useful for regula-
tory and risk management purposes, including collateralization); insurance companies; and
pension and investment funds, including hedge funds, all of which viewed the products as
desirable investments and useful collateral. Funds resulting from sales of securities, which
might in turn be repackaged into CDOs and eventually CDO squareds, etc., would be
used to collect new assets, thus continuing the process, so long as investors continued to
be willing to purchase the resulting securities.
2. Rating Agencies
As noted above, rating agencies played a key role in the advanced originate and dis-
tribute model. The rating agencies have been criticized periodically for slow analytical
reaction to deteriorating credit risks, rapid reappraisals, and an asymmetric view of credit
improvements and declines. Concern over their structured finance activity is different and
more fundamental. The effect of rapid changes in rating is less seen in sober reassess-
ments and changes in expectations of the kind predicted by market economists, but in
quantum-like, non-granular reactions. A fall in credit rating below a set level may cause
no change in intellectual sentiment but a conditioned and often compulsory sale by insti-
tutional investors constrained by ratings-based investment criteria. The implication,
rarely acknowledged outside the gossip of market professionals, is that ratings rarely in-
64. See Arner, Lejot & Schou-Zibel, supra note 2; FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, supra note 6; BANK OF
ENGLAND, supra note 6; TURNER REVIEW, supra note 6.
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duce or inform a portfolio investment decision, but may permit it to happen (institutional
investors frequently having contractual-or regulated-ratings minimum mandates for in-
vestments) or provide exculpatory evidence if the decision later proves mistaken.
It has been recognized for some time that credit rating agencies can engage in commer-
cially conflicted activities. IOSCO's code of conduct drew attention to this concern as a
regulatory issue but only extended to the general mission of the agencies, not their analyt-
ical techniques, which were viewed as sacrosanct in much the same way as many internal
quantitative models under the Basel market risk framework prior to the 1998 near-col-
lapse of LTCM.65 Criticism of the agencies has focused on two particular conflicts of
interest, namely compensation being met by issuers whose securities the agencies appraise
and the possibility that a rating agency, parent or, affiliate may derive revenue or other
benefits from issuers or their advisors. This focus neglects a specific, actual conflict inher-
ent in the origination process for structured transactions, and which the recent dislocation
has exposed to far wider concern. It arises from the quasi-origination function that the
leading rating agencies undertook whenever many complex transactions were under nego-
tiation, and it is this aspect of the current rating agency model that is likely to be reconsid-
ered in the medium-term. In addition, it is highly likely that quantitative risk modeling
will be generally subject to an increase in regulatory minimum-setting and scrutiny, not
only in structured transaction ratings but in a range of regulatory risk considerations.
3. Basel II
Significantly, these excesses received regulatory support through the replacement for
the 1998 Basel Capital Accord-Basel H. Recognizing that the 1988 Accord suffered from
numerous problems (especially relating to the way in which it deals with risk classification)
and also as a result of the Asian financial crisis, the Basel Committee began work on
developing a new capital accord in 1999. After approximately five years of discussion,
consultation and market testing, in 2004, the Basel Committee released the final agreed
framework.66 In 2005, the Committee released a slightly revised and updated version to
address certain aspects of trading activities 67 and, in 2006, released a comprehensive docu-
ment incorporating unchanged elements of the 1988 Accord and subsequent amendments
into a single framework. 68
Basel H is intended to provide an overall system of risk-based supervision and risk man-
agement (internal and market) for banks. It focuses on five major categories of risk: (1)
credit, (2) market, (3) operational, (4) liquidity, and (5) legal. 6 9 This framework involves
four levels: (1) identification of risk, (2) risk measurement, (3) risk disclosure, and (4) in-
65. Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns [IOSCO], Code of Conduct Fundamentals fbr Credit Rating Agencies (Decem-
ber 2004), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf.
66. BASEL COMsMI-I-FEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MFA-
SUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMPWORK (Bank for Int'l Settlements, 2004), available
at http://www.bis.org/pubVbcbs!07.pd fnoframes=l.
67. BASEL COMrIITrEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEA-
SUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRA.MEWORK (Bank for Int'l Settlements, 2005), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs 118.pdf?noframes= 1.
68. BASEL COALIr-FEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEA-
SURMIENTr AND CA'ITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK-COMPRFHENSIVE VERSION (Bank for Int'l
Settlements, 2006) ("Basel H"), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl28.pdfnoframes=l.
69. Id.
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ternal risk management. 70 Following this framework, Basel 11 implements a number of
changes through elements based upon three "pillars": Pillar I addresses minimum capital
requirements; Pillar II addresses supervisory review; and Pillar Ill addresses market disci-
pline through disclosure requirements. 71 The system is intended to be an evolutionary
system that can develop over time. The three pillars are intended to support the funda-
mental objectives of (1) "strengthen[ing] the soundness and stability of the international
banking system while" (2) "maintaining sufficient consistency that capital adequacy regu-
lation will not be a significant source of competitive inequality among internationally ac-
tive banks" through "promot[ing] the adoption of stronger risk management practices by
the banking industry."72 As with the 1988 Accord, Basel II is intended to apply to the
consolidated activities of internationally active banks, initially G-10 but gradually incorpo-
rated into other systems. 73
In attempting to achieve these objectives, Basel II incorporates a number of significant
elements, including a menu-based approach to capital charges, greater use of both credit
assessments by rating agencies and through banks' own internal models, increased recog-
nition of a variety of risk mitigation techniques, a new charge for operational risk, and new
requirements relating to supervisory review and new market disclosure obligations im-
posed on banks.
In relation to Pillar I (revised minimum capital requirements), the minimum ratio and
definition of capital required by the essential equation remain largely unchanged. The
main changes relate to the denominator, which is now the sum of risk-weighted assets,
market risk and operational risk charges. Market risk essentially remains, as under the
1996 Amendment, with a standardized approach and an internal models based (IRB) op-
tion. For the new operational risk charge, there are three options: Basic Indicator, Stan-
dardized, and Advanced Measurement Approaches (essentially IRB).74
In relation to credit risk, there is now a standardized approach and two IRB approaches
(foundation and advanced). The standardized approach includes much greater specificity
in relation to risk weightings (often based on ratings by external agencies) as well as new
operational requirements. 75 In addition, it allows much greater use of credit risk mitiga-
tion techniques, such as collateral, guarantees and credit derivatives, and on-balance sheet
netting. The two IRB approaches are based on banks' internal risk models and include
rules relating to the use of IRB models (qualification), data requirements, and minimum
charges. In terms of asset classes, separate requirements address: (1) corporate, sovereign,
and bank exposures; (2) retail exposures; (3) equity exposures; (4) purchased receivables;
and (5) securitization. 76
Pillar II includes four central principles. 77 First, banks "should have a process for as-
sessing their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 144-47.
75. Id. at 19-51.
76. Id. at 63-86.
77. Id. at 205-12.
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maintaining their capital levels" (Principle 1).78 Second, "[s]upervisors should review and
evaluate banks' internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies, as well as their ability
to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should
take appropriate supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the result of this process"
(Principle 2).79 Third, "[slupervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum
regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in
excess of the minimum" (Principle 3).80 Fourth, "[slupervisors should seek to intervene at
an early stage to prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels required to sup-
port the risk characteristics of a particular bank and should require rapid remedial action if
capital is not maintained or restored" (Principle 4).81
Pillar III deals with the supervisory review process through which supervisors should
monitor the activities of banks.
Overall, three elements of Basel II provided the most significant incentives to the ex-
cesses of the final years preceding the crisis of 2008: (1) greater recognition of quantitative
risk modeling, (2) reliance on credit ratings, and (3) regulatory recognition of credit risk
mitigation techniques, especially credit derivatives.
First, while the LTCM episode highlighted the potential dangers of overreliance on
quantitative modeling for risk management purposes, Basel II adopted many of the tech-
niques developed for market risk and allowed those to be applied not only to market risk
but also to credit and operational risk capital requirements, albeit with greater limits than
in the context of market risk.82 Under the Basel II framework, banks were encouraged to
develop internal risk models for all major categories of risks, with regulators setting mini-
mum parameters in which these models were to operate and be recognized for regulatory
purposes. The intention was to bring regulatory, economic, and accounting capital into
alignment. The result was to place enhanced reliance on quantitative risk management
techniques that proved to be less robust than previously thought when subjected to cir-
cumstances of extreme stress.
Second, Basel II, especially in the context of the standardized approaches, relies heavily
on external credit ratings for assignment of risk weights to varying categories of assets.
The intention was that use of external ratings would reduce the arbitrariness of the 1988
risk weightings and enhance their reasonableness from a market standpoint. The result
was that rating agencies received a substantial regulatory enhancement of the usage of
their products and increased market confidence therein. At the same time, as with the
earlier amendment dealing with risk weighting of restructuring OECD members, reliance
on credit ratings enhanced the procyclicality of capital regulation. In good times, ratings
were high with lower capital requirements and higher demand for highly rated products.
When the cycle turned, credit ratings were downgraded aggressively, leading to higher
capital requirements and need for capital.
Third, Basel H, in increasing regulatory recognition of risk mitigation techniques (based
largely on the experiences of the earlier amendment to recognize netting), increased the
78. Id. at 219.
79. Id. at 223.
80. Id. at 225.
81. Id. at 226.
82. For discussion, see Daniel K. Tarullo, BANKiNG ON BASEL: THE FuTuRE OF INTERNATIONAL FINAN-
CIAL REGULATION (2008). See also Arner, Lejot & Schou-Zibell, supra note 2.
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use of both collateral and credit derivatives, especially CDSs. In relation to collateral,
recognition was extended beyond traditional high quality government bonds to a range of
other highly rated debt securities. Such recognition increased the demand for such securi-
ties, especially among regulated financial institutions; however, during 2008, many of the
securities proved difficult to value or valueless and illiquid, thereby greatly reducing their
value as collateral and at the same time impairing capital of regulated institutions. Per-
haps more significantly, Basel II recognized CDSs from two angles: first as a credit risk
mitigation technique, and second as a means to acquire credit risk for portfolio purposes.
As a credit risk mitigation technique, financial institutions received strong incentives to
use CDSs to manage credit exposures, thereby providing an important incentive to market
development. At the same time, however, this usage dramatically increased counterparty
risks among financial institutions and the major dealers, which were assumed, incorrectly,
to be not allowed to fail, on the basis of LTCM cxpericnccs.
Most significantly, Basel II, through a combination of regulatory recognition of CDSs
and internal risk modeling, provided a strong incentive for financial institutions to view
credit on a portfolio basis (as had traditionally been done with market risk, such as equity
securities). Where banks were unable to purchase the credit risk (through loans or bonds)
necessary from the standpoint of portfolio construction, they were able to use CDSs to
acquire synthetic credit risk. While a portfolio approach to credit is probably the correct
approach for a complex institution, the use of CDSs brought with it counterparty risk to
the major dealers, such as Lehman and AIG. Such regulatory recognition also supported
the use of CDSs in the context of structured finance, for example in the context of CDOs.
m. Consequences and Responses
Towards the end of 2006, rising interest rates, subprime delinquencies, and downgrades
of structured products began to shake confidence in the new financial paradigm. By sum-
mer 2007, the tide had turned, resulting in a freeze in markets in August 2007, significant
equity market corrections, cuts in interest rates, and a seeming return to normalcy in the
U.S. stock markets, with foreign equity and global commodities markets being simultane-
ously propelled to new heights as money moved out of credit and into other opportuni-
ties.83 At the same time, the failure of Northern Rock in the United Kingdom in
September was followed by the beginning of the onset of the credit crisis globally as ad-
verse selection, loss of confidence, and changes in investor preferences weakened global
credit markets. 4
Key stresses emerged early in 2008 in the context of monoline insurance companies.
Historically, monolines had played an important, though low profile, role in the municipal
bond markets, providing third party guarantees to enhance debt securities. During the
1990s, as markets for securitization and complex debts instruments developed, monolines
became involved in providing credit support through various forms of insurance at various
levels in ABS and CDOs. As such securities faced increasing rating downgrades across
2007 and early 2008, it became obvious that monolines would be called on to provide
support to a much greater extent than anyone had expected (especially the monolines,
83. See Arner, Lejot & Schou-Zibell, supra note 2.
84. Id.
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which had underpriced their products). As a result, the monolines themselves came under
threat of credit downgrade, with the risk that their downgrade would result in further
downgrades of securities and massive losses among holders.
Consequently, the New York Insurance Commissioner (the state regulator and the most
important regulator for the U.S. insurance industry) organized a capital infusion, along
the lines of previous LTCM experience, sufficient to defuse any potential systemic risks
arising from this source.
A. BEAR STEARNS
The next major event, in March 2008, was the failure of Bear Steams, the fifth largest
U.S. investment bank and the one with the least diversified business and the greatest di-
rect involvement in debt capital markets.85 While problems had been developing for
some months, Bear Steams faced severe liquidity problems on March 14, 2008, forcing
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to provide emergency funding through J.P. Mor-
gan.86 Nonetheless, after the markets closed that day, it became apparent that the emer-
gency funding could not halt Bear Steams' downward spiral, prompting Bear Stearns to
conclude that it would need to file for bankruptcy protection on March 17, 2008, unless it
was acquired by another firm.8 7 On March 16, 2008, J.P. Morgan agreed to buy Bear
Stearns with financing support from the New York Fed.88 In May of 2008, the sale was
completed.8 9
At the time, the events surrounding Bear Stearns were unprecedented. For the first
time, a major investment bank that was well-capitalized and apparently fully liquid exper-
ienced an enormous loss of confidence that denied it not only unsecured financing, but
short-term secured financing, even when the collateral consisted of agency securities with
a market value in excess of the funds to be borrowed. 90 Counterparties would not provide
securities lending services and clearing services, and prime brokerage clients moved their
cash balances elsewhere. These decisions of counterparties, clients, and lenders to no
longer transact with Bear Stearns in turn influenced other counterparties, clients, and
lenders to also reduce their exposure to Bear Steams.
B. FANNiE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC
As central institutions in the U.S. mortgage market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
logical concerns for market participants. In this context, the GSEs were the largest par-
85. Jeff Pruzan, Timeline: Bear Stearns' Year of Turmoil, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 2008, available at http://www.
ft.com/cms/s/d7936764-fld5-1 ldc-9b45-0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid=1c573392-301 5-1 lda-ba9f-00000e25
1 lc8.
86. See Press Release, Federal Reserve, The Federal Reserve is Monitoring Market Developments Closely
and Will Continue to Provide Liquidity as Necessary to Promote the Orderly Functioning of the Financial
System (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080314a.
hon.
87. Id.
88. Office of Inspector Gen., Office of Audits, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Report No. 446-A, SEC's Oversight of
Bear Steams and Related Entities: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program iv (2008).
89. Id. See Bear Steams, http://www.bearsteams.com/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
90. SEC Report, supra note 88, at v.
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ticipants in the U.S. markets, through guarantees, purchases, and securitization of "con-
forming loans."91 The GSEs, though technically not backed by the U.S. government,
were implicitly assumed by markets to be so backed. DuringJuly 2008, the markets tested
this assumption. The result was explicit government backing for the two institutions
through the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.92
Unfortunately, by the beginning of September, losses of market confidence meant that
the explicit guarantee of the two GSEs was no longer sufficient, and to prevent their
bankruptcy, the U.S. Treasury under HERA, placed them into a Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA) conservatorship on September 7.93 Essentially, Fannie and Freddie posed
systemic risk not only because of their central role in U.S. mortgage markets, but also
because they are the largest issuers of U.S. government agency debt securities. Impor-
tantly, these securities are held by financial institutions and institutional investors (includ-
ing insurance companies and pensions funds) around the world. In addition, foreign
governments including China (300+ billion dollars) and Japan (200+ billion dollars) are
very large purchasers and holders of such securities. 94 A default by Fannie and Freddie
undoubtedly would have triggered not only a systemic financial crisis in the United States,
but also a severe economic crisis, as the U.S. government became unable to fund itself
through debt sales.
While this re-nationalization of the U.S. GSEs addressed their systemic risk, it did not
prevent the final trigger of the systemic crisis: the failures of Lehman Brothers and AIG.
C. SYSTEMIC CRISIS
On September 15, Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest U.S. investment bank, filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. With 680 billion dollars in assets, 650 billion dollars
in liabilities and over 100,000 creditors around the world, this is the largest and most
complex bankruptcy in history.95 This event would come to be seen as the trigger for the
subsequent systemic crisis.
Over the preceding weekend, the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve organized a series
of meetings, similar to those previously organized for LTCM in 1998, to try to find a
private sector resolution for Lehman Brothers along the lines of that organized for Bear
Stearns in March.96 For a range of reasons, however, including the unwillingness of the
U.S. government to provide sufficient financing, no private sector solution was possible.
At the time, the decision was made that a failure of Lehman would not pose systemic risk
and that therefore it must be allowed to fail. Unfortunately, in hindsight, this decision
91. See Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/index.jhoml (last visited Apr. 6, 2009) and Freddie Mac,
http://www.freddiemac.com/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
92. On Jul. 30, 2007, the U.S. Congress introduced what would become known as the Housing and Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654.
93. Press Release, U.S. Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal
Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sep. 7, 2008), available at http:/
/www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp 1129.htm.
94. U.S. Treasury & Federal Reserve, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities (Mar. 16, 2009), avail-
able at hrtp://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt.
95. See Lehman Brothers, http://www.lehmanbrothers.com/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
96. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury, Paulson Statement on SEC and Federal Reserve Actions Surrounding
Lehman Brothers (Sep. 14, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1 134.htm.
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was incorrect, and the insolvency would have unintended consequences as the firm's posi-
tions in equity, debt, and derivatives markets around the world dramatically increased
uncertainty (if Lehman failed, anyone could fail) and shattered already weak confidence
among financial market participants.
Around the same time, after pulling out of the bidding for Lehman, Bank of America
agreed to acquire Merrill Lynch, the third largest U.S. investment bank.
Finally, the same weekend, American International Group (AIG), at the time the
world's largest insurance company (with over one trillion dollars in assets globally), an-
nounced that it required a loan from the Federal Reserve in order to survive. 97 This
announcement was a shock, as insurance companies are not regulated by the Federal Re-
serve, and there were serious questions regarding the legality of any such support. 98 Dur-
ing the preceding weekend, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury had discovered that AIG
had become one of the largest counterparties in the global CDS market. The realization
was that, with the downgrade, AIG would be unable to meet calls for additional collateral
on these positions and would default. The default (due to the influence of Basel H in
European financial markets especially) would probably cause the insolvency of many of
the world's largest financial institutions, once again a certain case of systemic risk.
As a result, on Tuesday, September 16, the Treasury guaranteed a two year, eighty-five
billion dollar bridge loan from the Federal Reserve, resulting in a 79.9 percent equity
stake for the U.S. government.99 Unlike in the case of Lehman, creditors and counterpar-
ties were protected.
By Thursday, September 18, the series of events proved too much for the global finan-
cial system, and it began to collapse. Most significantly, the collapse was triggered by
uncertainty, loss of confidence, and adverse selection, but also by direct losses resulting
from the collapse of Lehman. On September 18, the U.K. government announced that
Lloyds TSB would takeover Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS), which otherwise would
have failed.100 In the United States, the oldest money market fund, the Reserve Primary
Fund with sixty-two billion dollars in assets announced that as a result of total losses on
785 million dollars in commercial paper (short term debt) issued by Lehman, it would
have to close and would not be able to pay its customers in full.101 This event, known as
97. American International Group: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111 th Cong. (Mar. 24,
2009) (statement of Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board).
98. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 343 (West 2001). Although contentious because AIG, as an insurance company, is
not regulated by the Federal Reserve, section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act was used to provide the
necessary authority.
99. Press Release, Federal Reserve (Sept. 16, 2008) (announcing that the Federal Reserve Board, with full
support of the Treasury Department, authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to eighty-
five billion dollars to the American International Group (AIG)), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm. See also Press Release, Federal Reserve (Oct. 8, 2008) (announcing
that the Federal Reserve Board authorizes Federal Reserve Bank of New York to borrow securities from
certain regulated U.S. insurance subsidiaries of AIG), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/other/20081008a.htm. On Oct. 8, 2008, the Federal Reserve took further action to replenish AIG's
liquidity, with the FRBNY agreeing to borrow up to 37.8 billion dollars in investment-grade, fixed-income
securities from AIG in return for cash collateral. Id.
100. Bank Shares Fall Despite Bailout, BBC NEWS, Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/7622380.sm.
101. See Tara S. Bernard, Money Market Funds Enter a World of Risk, N.Y. TiMFS, Sept. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.nyimes.com/2008/09/18/business/yournoney/18money.html?em.
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"breaking the buck," in general, along with preceding rumors, triggered a run on money
market funds with outflows of 200 billion dollars from September 15-19.102 In the context
of the U.S. financial system, money market funds are at the heart of funding, with over
three trillion dollars in assets. 103 The same day, Putnam announced the failure of a retail
fund (twelve billion dollars) and Bank of New York Mellon of an institutional fund, all in
addition to the failure of three Lehman money market funds.- °
At this point, panic set in in earnest, with market participants driving gold prices up a
record amount and short term U.S. Treasury bills down to the lowest level (0.02 percent)
since 1941 in a violent rush to safe assets. On September 18, the global financial system
was collapsing. If it were to collapse, the global financial system and economy would
follow as in the Great Depression.
In order to stop or slow the collapsing of the financial system, in addition to the bolster-
ing of traditional short-term liquidity mechanisms, the Fed acted to increase liquidity dra-
matically. Despite the creation and bolstering of these mechanisms (the forward TAF
created later in September aside105), the financial death spiral continued. On the after-
noon of September 18, the U.S. Treasury announced a guarantee of money market funds
of up to fifty billion dollars through the Exchange Stabilization Fund, established in 1934
to protect the value of the U.S. currency in international markets and last used to provide
financial support to Mexico during the Tequila Crisis of 1994-1995.106 Additionally, the
Fed announced a new program to support the money markets, the Asset Backed Commer-
cial Paper (ABCP) Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) Liquidity Facility (AMLF).107
These emergency actions helped stabilize money market outflows, but the credit markets,
especially the interbank markets, ceased to function and essentially remained in the same
state until the week of October 13.
On another front around the same time, in exception to the theme of sole U.S. action,
the SEC, in concert with the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) 108 and a wide range
of other securities regulators around the world, temporarily banned short sales of financial
102. See Naohiko Baba, Robert N. McCauley & Srichander Ramaswamy, US Dollar Money Market Funds and
Non-US Banks, BIS Q. REv., Mar. 2009.
103. See id.
104. See Diana B. Henriques, Professional Money Fund is Closed by Putnam, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/business/19money.html.
105. Press Release, Federal Reserve (Sept. 29, 2008) (announcing the commitment of the Federal Reserve
and other central banks to further coordinate actions to expand significantly the capacity to provide U.S.
dollar liquidity) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080929a.htm. On
September 29, 2008, the Fed introduced another new program, the FTAF, designed to provide reassurance to
market participants that term funding will be available over year-end.
106. Press Release, U.S. Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds (Sept.
19, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hpll47.htm. See also Press Release, Federal Re-
serve, Federal Reserve Board Announces Two Enhancements to Its Programs to Provide Liquidity to Markets
(Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080919a.htm. For
a discussion of the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund during the Tequila Crisis, see Mexican Peso Crisis,
supra note 57.
107. Press Release, Federal Reserve (Sept. 19, 2008) (announcing two enhancements to the Federal Reserve
Board's programs to provide liquidity to markets), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/monetary/20080919a.htm.
108. Press Release, FSA (Sept. 18, 2008) (announcing FSA's statement on short positions in financial stocks),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR12008/l02.shtml.
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stocks "to prohibit short selling in financial companies to protect the integrity and quality
of the securities market and strengthen investor confidence." 09
On September 20, in order to resuscitate the U.S. credit markets, which had suffered
the financial equivalent of a heart attack and were now on liquidity life support provided
by the Federal Reserve, U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson approached the U.S. Congress
and asked for authorization to issue up to 700 billion dollars of Treasury securities to
finance the purchase of "troubled assets" under the "Troubled Assets Relief Plan"
(TARP).l10 This proposal essentially called a time out in the financial crisis, and the sys-
tem went on hold (on continuing Federal Reserve life support) while the U.S. Congress
discussed the plan. The bill, however, was met with American public outrage.
Had the plan been adopted quickly, it is possible (though certainly unknown) that the
TARP may have prevented the credit crisis from becoming a systemic financial crisis, with
consequent impact on the real economy. The structure could have addressed two
problems simultaneously: illiquidity of structured products and impairment to bank capi-
tal, with problem assets removed from banks and held by the U.S. government until more
normal conditions returned, thus allowing banks to focus on improving their business
going forward.
While the U.S. financial crisis did not worsen dramatically during the week of Septem-
ber 20, the credit markets essentially did not function, and it can be said that it was in this
period that the United States witnessed the first systemic crisis in the U.S. financial system
since the 1930s. At the same time, however, the United States did not see a systemic
collapse of the financial system in September 2008, which we did see following 1929.
Nonetheless, as the discussions lengthened, individual financial institutions began to fail,
most significantly WaMu in the United States.
On September 25, the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) closed WaMu, the larg-
est remaining S&L in the United States and now the largest bank failure in U.S. his-
tory."' Thereafter, the FDIC held a bidding process that resulted in J.P. Morgan's
acquisition of the majority (307 billion dollars) of WaMu's assets and deposits (188 billion
dollars) for a payment of 1.9 billion dollars to the FDIC.'12 Importantly, stockholders and
bondholders (46.6 billion dollars) were wiped out, with the exception of holders of securi-
ties from a four billion dollar covered bond program. 113 The consequences of the WaMu
failure were considerable, with much of its debt held by financial institutions around the
world. This failure seriously worsened the financial condition of financial institutions
around the world and worsened the condition of the U.S. financial system.
By this time, the financial crisis was taking its toll globally. On September 29, in order
to prevent major financial institution failures, the United Kingdom nationalized Bradford
109. Press Release, SEC, SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets
(Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/20O8/2008-2 11 htn.
110. Press Release, U.S. Treasury, Fact Sheet: Proposed Treasury Authority to Purchase Troubled Assets
(Sept. 20, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hpl 150.htm.
11. Press Release, FDIC, JPMorgan Chase Acquires Banking Operations of Washington Mutual: FDIC
Facilitates Transaction that Protects All Depositors and Comes at No Cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund
(Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/prO8085.html.
112. Id.
113. See Press Release, FDIC, CONrTINUATION OF CoNTRAcrs TRANSFERRED FROM WASHINGTON MU-
TUAL BAms (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/prO8085c.html.
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& Bingley;114 Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg nationalized Fortis;115 Germany
announced the first rescue of Hypo Real Estate;116 Iceland nationalized its third-largest
bank Glitnir; l1 7 and in the United States, FDIC and the Federal Reserve helped facilitate
the sale of Wachovia, the sixth largest U.S. bank by assets (700 billion dollars, with 400
billion dollars in deposits) to Citigroup.118 The same day, the U.S. House of Representa-
tives rejected the proposed TARP in the form of the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 (EESA), driving what had been a systemic financial crisis into a potentially
systemic economic crisis.119 On September 30, France and Belgium rescued Dexia, and
Ireland announced a blanket guarantee of all deposits in its financial system.
During the week after the failure of the TARP in the United States, global stock prices
dropped viciously, and the credit crisis moved from a financial event to an economic
event, as credit ceased to be available not only across the financial system but also across
the economy, and the public lost confidence in the financial system.
D. LNTERNATIONAL AND DoMEsTIc REsPONSES
With significant impetus from these events, the U.S. Senate passed a revised bill on
October 1, with the House following suit, and the President signing the EESA on Octo-
ber 3, 2008. By this time, however, the financial crisis had moved to the real economy,
and a TARP alone was apparently insufficient to hide the problems or prevent the result-
ing damage. During the following week, domestic responses appeared rapidly, including a
200 billion pound (300 billion dollars) rescue package from the United Kingdom, focusing
on three elements: capital, liquidity, and funding.120 These elements would subsequently
become central to the international response to the systemic crisis that was to emerge the
following week.
1. Global Financial Response
During the week of October 6-10, 2008, a comprehensive global response emerged.
While not sufficient to prevent the systemic financial crisis or significant economic dam-
age, the response has been sufficient to resuscitate the U.S. and global financial systems.
114. See Press Release, H.M. Treasury, Bradford & Bingley plc, Sept. 29, 2008, available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_97-08.htm.
115. See Reed Stevenson, Details of Fortis Partial Nationalization, REUTnERS UK (Sept. 29, 2008), available at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/hotStocksNews/idUKLT21933020080929.
116. Press Release, Hypo Real Estate, Hypo Real Estate Group has Secured Major New Funding Facility,
(Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://www.hyporealestate.com/eng/pdf/PI-HREG 29.09.2008_engl.pdf.
117. Iceland Nationalises Glitnir Bank, BBC NEws, Sept. 29, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
business/7641753.sn.
118. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Department, Statement by Secretary Paulson on the Sale of Wachovia
Bank (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp1164.htn (confirming systemic
risk); Press Release, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Federal Reserve Ready to Provide Liquidity in
Wachovia Transition (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/press-room/press-releases
banking/2008/wachovia-transaction-20080929.cfm (confirming liquidity provision); Press Release, FDIC,
CITIGROUP INC. TO ACQUIRE BANKING OPERATIONS OF WACHOVIA (SEPT. 29, 2008), available at http://
www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08088.html.
119. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008).
120. Press Release, I-LM Treasury, Financial Support to the Banking Industry, Press Notice 100/08 (Oct. 8,
2008), available at htrp://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press-l00_08.htm.
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Signaled by the Group of Seven (G-7), on October 10, 2008, the comprehensive approach
included the following elements: (1) use of "all available tools to support systemically im-
portant financial institutions and prevent their failure;" (2) ensuring that financial institu-
tions "have broad access to liquidity and funding;" (3) establishing recapitalization
schemes so banks can "raise capital from public as well as private sources;" (4) ensuring
"robust and consistent" protection for depositors; and (5) taking action to "restart the
secondary market for mortgages and other securitized assets." 121
This statement was reaffirmed by the full membership of the IMF and World Bank, 22
as well as the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the European Union, with actions
directly following the agreed approach. In addition, on October 8, 2008, the world's ma-
jor central banks announced their first globally coordinated interest rate cut, with the U.S.
Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England, the Bank of
Sweden, the Swiss National Bank (SNB), and the Bank of Canada all cutting interest rates
by fifty basis points (BPS) and issuing a coordinated statement for the first time.123 Fur-
ther, in the aftermath of the G-7 and IMF/World Bank/FSF meetings the following week-
end, the Federal Reserve dramatically increased the provision of liquidity in dollars to the
world's major central banks. These efforts built on earlier efforts, namely the December
2007 authorization by the Federal Reserve of temporary reciprocal currency arrangements
(swap lines) with the ECB, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, and the SNB for a
total of up to twenty-four billion dollars. 124 By late September 2008, the Federal Reserve
had made similar arrangements with the Bank of Japan, the National Bank of Denmark,
the Bank of Norway, the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the Bank of Sweden. The aggre-
gate amount authorized over this period rose from twenty-four billion dollars to 620 bil-
lion dollars.12 5 By October 13, 2008, the Federal Reserve had agreed to provide unlimited
dollar liquidity to the ECB, the Bank of England, the SNB, and the Bank of Japan.126
While not sufficient to prevent widespread economic consequences, this coordinated
approach and subsequent actions at the domestic and international level have been suffi-
cient both to prevent the collapse of the global financial system and to begin to return it to
operation. As a result, attention has now turned towards addressing the economic conse-
121. Group of Seven, G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Plan of Action, Washington, D.C.,
(Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fin081010.hon (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
122. See Press Release, International Monetary Fund, Communiqu6 of the International Monetary and
Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund 13, IMF Press Release
No. 08/240 (Oct. 11, 2008), available at http://imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/prO8240.htm.
123. Press Release, U.S. Federal Reserve, Joint Statement by Central Banks (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http:/
/www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081008a.hon.
124. Press Release, U.S. Federal Reserve (Dec. 12, 2007) (announcing measures taken by the Bank of Ca-
nada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank "to
address elevated pressures in short-term funding markets"), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/new-
sevents/press/monetary/ 20071212a.htm.
125. Press Release, U.S. Federal Reserve (Sept. 29, 2008) (announcing "coordinated actions" undertaken by
central banks "to expand significantly the capacity to provide U.S. dollar liquidity"), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/moneary/20080929a.htm.
126. Press Release, U.S. Federal Reserve (Oct. 13, 2008) (announcing "further measures" undertaken by
several central banks "to improve liquidity in short-term U.S. dollar funding markets"), available at http:/
www.federareserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081013a.htm. All of these temporary reciprocal swap
facilities have been authorized through April 30, 2009. Id.
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quences (a discussion beyond the scope of this article) and the necessary reforms of finan-
cial regulation.
IV. Implications for Financial Regulation
In this context of financial regulatory reactions to the crisis, those offered by the FSF
and the Group of 20 (G-20) have emerged as the most significant at the international
level.
A. FiNANciL STABILITY FORUM
In April 2008, during the initial stages of the crisis, the FSF 127 met and released a signif-
icant report, albeit one which, in many ways, would be overshadowed by subsequent
events. 128 In this report, the FSF focused on regulatory reforms in five main areas,
namely: (1) prudential oversight, especially capital, liquidity, and risk management; (2)
transparency and valuation; (3) role and uses of credit ratings; (4) authorities' responsive-
ness; and (5) arrangements for dealing with financial stress. 129 Within these five areas,
seven issues received the most attention: (1) risk disclosures of the exposures and financial
condition of individual financial institutions; (2) a direction to the International Account-
ing Standards Board (IASB) to address off-balance sheet treatment and valuation of com-
plex securities; (3) changes to Basel II, especially to address treatment of securitization and
off-balance sheet activities; (4) new standards for liquidity; (5) attention to use of credit
ratings and regulation of credit ratings agencies through International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Joint Forum, and domestic regulators; (6) develop-
ment of supervisory colleges for financial institutions; and (7) in respect to OTC deriva-
tives, developing a CDS clearing house, including bilateral and multilateral netting
mechanisms, systems to address defaults, and mechanisms for trading and settlement. 130
The FSF met again in October 2008, in the context of the G-7 finance ministers meet-
ing taking place at the same time as the IMF/World Bank annual meeting. In its subse-
quent report, the FSF reaffirmed the contents of the April 2008 report, but it also
significantly extended its attention to four new areas: (1) improving international interac-
tion and consistency of emergency arrangements and responses (an issue that had clearly
127. The Financial Stability Forum, formed in 1999 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, comprises
financial authorities from developed financial systems (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, European Central Bank)
and the major international financial institutions (Bank for International Settlements [BIS], IMF, World
Bank), international regulatory and supervisory bodies (Basel Committee, International Organization of Se-
curities Commissions IOSCO], International Association of Insurance Supervisors [IAIS], International Ac-
counting Standards Board [IASB]), and committees of central bank experts (Committee on the Global
Financial System [CGFS], Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems [CPSS]). See Financial Stability
Forum: About the FSF-History, http://www.fsforum.org/about/history.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2009); see
also Financial Stability Forum, About the FSF-Overview, http://www.fsfornm.org/about/overview.htm (last
visited Mar. 23, 2009).
128. See generally FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THFE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING
MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE (2008), available at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/
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become important by this time); (2) mitigating procyclicality, including in the context of
capital, loan-loss provisioning, compensation, and valuation/leverage; (3) addressing the
scope of financial regulation to emphasize currently unregulated aspects; and (4) better
integrating macroeconomic oversight and prudential supervision. 31 Both of these reports
from the FSF have subsequently been largely subsumed in the November 2008 G-20
statement.
B. GROUP OF TWENry (NOVEMBER 2008)
On November 15, 2008, following two days of meetings in Washington D.C., the lead-
ers of the G-20132 released their Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the
World Economy.133 In this declaration, the G-20 discussed the causes of the crisis, commit-
ted to supporting an open global economy, and defined a range of actions to be taken
(under the supervision of G-20 finance ministers) to reform financial regulation to avoid
future crises.' 34 More specifically, the G-20 members stated that:
[]e must lay the foundation for reform to help to ensure that a global crisis, such as
this one, does not happen again. Our work will be guided by a shared belief that
market principles, open trade and investment regimes, and effectively regulated fi-
nancial markets foster the dynamism, innovation, and entrepreneurship that are es-
sential for economic growth, employment, and poverty reduction. 13
While the majority of press and market attention focused on the various global eco-
nomic aspects (and the general lack of tangible success in this respect to date), 136 in many
131. Fin. Stability Forum, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING MARKET AND
INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE: FOLLOW-UP ON IMPLFMENTATION 2 (2008), available at http://www.fsforum.
org/press/pr_081009f.pdf.
132. The G-20, formed in 1999 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, comprises Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, European Union, IMF, and World Bank. See THE
GROUP OF TWENTY: A HISTORY 8 (2007), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20history.pdf. In addi-
don, the United Nations Secretary General and the FSF Chair were invited to attend the November 2008
meeting. Id.
133. Group of Twenty [G-201, Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (Nov. 15,
2008), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20Osummitdeclaration.pdf [hereinafter G-20 Declara-
tion]. Certain aspects, especially those relating to the global economy and the international financial architec-
ture, build upon the G-20 finance miniters' communiqu6 from the previous week. See G-20, Meeting of
Ministers and Governors, Sio Paulo, Braz., Nov. 8-9, 2008, Communiqul, available at http://www.g20.org/
Documents/2008_communique.saopaulo brazil.pdf.
134. Id.
135. G-20 Declaration, nipra note 133 at T 2.
136. Specifically, the G-20 recognized that:
[Rleforms will only be successful if grounded in a commitment to free market principles, includ-
ing the rule of law, respect for private property, open trade and investment, competitive markets,
and efficient, effectively regulated financial systems. These principles are essential to economic
growth and prosperity and have lifted millions out of poverty, and have significantly raised the
global standard of living.
Id. at 12. In this context, the G-20 highlighted aspects relating to (1) trade, (2) development, and (3) other
issues, including "energy security and climate change, food security, the rule of law, and the fight against
terrorism, poverty and disease." Id. at T 15. With respect to trade, the G-20 rejected protectionism; commit-
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ways, the most significant aspects of the proposed remedies relate to reform of financial
regulation while at the same time avoiding over-regulation. As the G-20 members stated:
"Recognizing the necessity to improve financial sector regulation, we must avoid over-
regulation that would hamper economic growth and exacerbate the contraction of capital
flows, including to developing countries." 137 In this context, the G-20 established five
main principles to guide reforms: (1) strengthening transparency and accountability; (2)
enhancing sound regulation; (3) promoting integrity in financial markets; (4) reinforcing
international cooperation; and (5) reforming the financial architecture.' 38 For each of
these five principles, the leaders established a detailed action plan, incorporating immedi-
ate actions (to be taken by March 31, 2009) and medium-term actions. 139 The detailed
Action Plan establishes the core content of the refinements to international financial regu-
latory standards to take place. In addition, the leaders tasked finance ministers to give
highest priority to six areas: (1) mitigating against procyclicality in regulatory policy; (2)
reviewing and aligning global accounting standards, particularly for complex securities; (3)
strengthening the resilience and transparency of credit derivatives markets and reducing
their systemic risks, including by improving the infrastructure of the OTC markets; (4)
reviewing compensation practices as they relate to incentives for risk taking and innova-
tion; (5) reviewing the international financial architecture; and (6) defining the scope of
systemically important financial institutions and determining their appropriate regulation
and oversight. 14°
As was already mentioned above, these same issues were, for the most part, addressed in
detail by the FSF in its April 2008 report. The November 2008 G-20 Declaration, how-
ever, establishes the framework for the content of financial regulation going forward. To
follow up on commitments from the November 2008 summit, the G-20 agreed to meet
again in April 2009 in London.
1. Principles and Action Plan
In issuing the November 2008 Declaration, the G-20 agreed that the following overrid-
ing principle should guide reform efforts to avoid future crises:
Regulation is first and foremost the responsibility of national regulators who consti-
tute the first line of defense against market instability. However, our financial mar-
kets are global in scope, therefore, intensified international cooperation among
regulators and strengthening of international standards, where necessary, and their
ted for the next twelve months not to "rais[e] new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services,
impos[el new export restrictions, or implementing [WTOI inconsistent measures to stimulate exports;" and
instructed G-20 trade ministers to successfully conclude the '7T0 Doha Development Agenda. Id. at ' 13.
With respect to development, the G-20 reaffirmed the Millennium Development Goals, previously made
development assistance commitments, and the 2002 Monterrey principles for financing development. See id.
at T 14.
137. Id. at 1 12.
138. See id. at 9.
139. See generally G-20, Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Action Plan (Nov. 15,
2008), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summitdeclaration.pdf [hereinafter G-20 Action
Plan].
140. See G-20 Declaration, supra note 133 at 10.
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consistent implementation is necessary to protect against adverse cross-border, re-
gional and global developments affecting international financial stability.141
As noted above, in its Declaration, the G-20 established five main principles to guide
reforms. To support progress toward achieving these principles, the G-20 has established
a "comprehensive work plan" under the authority of the G-20 finance ministers, who are
"responsible for the development and implementation of these recommendations drawing
on the ongoing work of relevant bodies, including the [IMF], and expanded [FSF], and
standard setting bodies." 142 The Action Plan includes both "Immediate Actions" to be
undertaken by March 31, 2009, and also "Medium-term actions," for which no specific
deadline is set in the Declaration.
a. Transparency and Accountability
Under the first principle, the G-20 committed to "strengthen financial market trans-
parency, including by enhancing required disclosure on complex financial products and
ensuring complete and accurate disclosure by firms of their financial conditions." 143 The
principle thus highlights two central aspects of the crisis: (1) transparency of complex
financial products such as CDOs and (2) transparency of firms themselves. In addition,
the principle highlights that "[i]ncentives should be aligned to avoid excessive risk-taking,"
another central feature of the crisis.144
The Action Plan contains five points for immediate action and three points for me-
dium-term action. 145 Four of the immediate actions address accounting and disclosure:
(1) valuation of securities including complex illiquid products, especially during times of
stress; (2) required disclosures of complex instruments; (3) accounting and disclosure stan-
dards for off-balance sheet vehicles; and (4) review of the membership and governance of
the IASB.146 The final point is unusual in that it requests private sector bodies to produce
unified best practices for hedge funds, with responsibility for review of these standards
placed on finance ministers drawing upon analysis of regulators, the FSF, and other rele-
vant bodies.' 47
The medium-term actions, on the other hand, address three points. 148 First, global
accounting standards bodies should work intensively to create a single set of global ac-
counting standards. Second, regulators, supervisors, accounting standard setters, and the
private sector should ensure consistent application and enforcement of accounting stan-
dards. Third, financial institutions should enhance risk and loss disclosures, with regula-
tors focusing on completeness, including off-balance sheet activities.
149
141. Id. at 8.
142. G-20 Action Plan, snpra note 139.
143. G-20 Declaration, supra note 133 at 9.
144. Id.
145. G-20 Action Plan, supra note 139.
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b. Regulation
Under the second principle, the G-20 committed to: (1) strengthening financial regula-
tory regimes, prudential oversight, and risk management; and (2) ensuring that "all finan-
cial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate
to their circumstances." 50 In particular, the G-20 highlighted for attention (1) credit
rating agencies, (2) the goal of making regulatory regimes more effective over the eco-
nomic cycle while "ensuring that regulation is efficient, does not stifle innovation, and
encourages expanded trade in financial products and services," and (3) a new commitment
to transparent assessments of national regulatory systems.1si
In support of these objectives, the Action Plan addresses three areas: (1) regulatory
regimes; (2) prudential oversight; and (3) risk management. 5 2
i. Regulatory Regimes
In relation to regulatory regimes, for immediate action, the IMF, FSF, and regulators
are directed to "develop recommendations to mitigate procyclicality," which should spe-
cifically include a review of the impacts that valuation, leverage, bank capital, executive
compensation, and provisioning may have.153 As was noted previously, the current capital
adequacy framework is by its nature procyclical. While policymakers have been aware of
this reality for many years, this is the first time there has been an international commit-
ment to consider and address the issue. In addition, the Action Plan addresses four me-
dium-term actions. The first is a commitment by countries and regions to "review and
report on the structure and principles of its regulatory system to ensure it is compatible
with a modern and increasingly globalized financial system." s5 4 In this context, all mem-
bers of the G-20 have specifically committed to undertake a Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP) review.'55 The second is a direction to regulators and standard setters to
conduct two reviews: a review of "the differentiated nature of regulation in the banking,
securities, and insurance sectors"' 56 and a review of "the scope of financial regulation, with
a special emphasis on institutions, instruments, and markets that are currently unregu-
lated, along with ensuring that all systemically-important institutions are appropriately
regulated." 5 7 This point is key: regulation will be reviewed to address regulatory arbi-
trage and to cover existing gaps between regulators and jurisdictions.
The third action is a direction to address resolution and insolvency regimes in order to
ensure that they "permit an orderly wind-down of large complex cross-border financial
institutions."158 Once again, this issue has been recognized for some years, but it has been
too complicated and politically sensitive to address. While in no way simple, this issue is
the starting point for addressing a central weakness in the legal framework for global
finance.
150. G-20 Declaration, supra note 133 at 9.
151. Id.
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The fourth action addresses capital adequacy, specifically that "[d]efinitions of capital
should be harmonized in order to achieve consistent measures of capital and capital ade-
quacy." 59 One aspect of the crisis, triggered especially by the failure of WaMu, has been
a realization by markets and regulators that Tier 1 (equity) capital is the only capital that
really matters and that the various forms of debt comprising Tier 2 (and Tier 3 in the
context of market risk) did not create the desired monitoring effect and in the context of
the crisis in fact exacerbated problems, as holders of financial institution debt often were
financial institutions themselves.
ii. Prudential Oversight
In relation to prudential oversight, the Action Plan specifies four immediate and two
medium-term actions. Two of the four immediate actions address credit rating agencies,
specifically that regulators and IOSCO should make sure that agencies meet international
standards, especially in relation to (1) conflicts of interest, (2) increasing disclosure to
investors and issuers, and (3) differentiating ratings for complex products.160 Interest-
ingly, IOSCO is mandated to actually review CRA compliance.
The third immediate action addresses capital, specifically that banks maintain adequate
capital and that international standards are strengthened for banks' securitization and
structured finance activities.
16 1
The fourth immediate action addresses CDSs and OTC derivatives, including the
launch of CDS central counterparty systems, reduction of systemic risks in CDS and
OTC derivatives transactions, development of exchange-traded or electronic trading plat-
forms for CDSs, expansion of OTC derivatives market transparency, and improvement of
the robustness of OTC derivatives infrastructure.' 62 This action has very important im-
plications for the OTC derivatives markets, especially CDSs. The preference is to move
these out of the OTC space and into a much more transparent and regulated context.
There are two medium-term actions. The first mandates the registration of credit rat-
ing agencies. 163 The second addresses liquidity from two angles: liquidity supervision of
cross-border banks and central bank liquidity operations for cross-border banks.164
iii. Risk Management
Risk management includes seven immediate and two medium-term actions. The seven
immediate actions address: (1) enhanced international guidance for banks' risk manage-
ment; (2) enhanced liquidity risk management and creating strong liquidity cushions; (3)
more timely and comprehensive measurement of risk concentrations and large
counterparty risk positions across products and geographies; (4) improved internal risk
management models and reporting; (5) a direction to the Basel Committee to develop new




162. Id. at 3.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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tives; and (7) more effective risk management and due diligence of structured products
and securitization. 6 5
The two medium-term actions are both potentially far reaching in their implications.
Under the first, standard-setters and others should "ensure that regulatory policy makers
are aware and able to respond quickly to evolution and innovation in financial markets and
products."16
6
Under the second, "[a]uthorities should monitor substantial changes in asset prices, and
their implications for the macro-economy and the financial system." 167 While central
bankers spent a great deal of time over the past decade arguing about whether or not asset
prices should be taken into account in the context of macroeconomic management, it
appears the debate is now over on this point.
c. Integrity
Under the third principle, the G-20 committed to:
Protect the integrity of the world's financial markets by bolstering investor and con-
sumer protection, avoiding conflicts of interest, preventing illegal market manipula-
tion, fraudulent activities and abuse, and protecting against illicit finance risks arising
from non-cooperative jurisdictions.' 68
In respect to the final point, the G-20 highlighted information sharing, especially with
respect to bank secrecy and transparency.169
The Action Plan reflects this statement closely, with three immediate actions, address-
ing: (1) enhancement of regulatory cooperation; (2) promotion of information sharing
regarding market stability and ensuring that domestic legal provisions are adequate; and
(3) review of conduct rules and sanctions regimes for cross-border misconduct. 70 Two of
the three medium-term actions, however, go much further. The first supports the on-
going work of the FATF and the World Bank-U.N. Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative.
17
'
The second requires national and international measures to protect the global financial
system from "uncooperative and non-transparent jurisdictions that pose risks of illicit fi-
nancial activity." 17 2 The third directs the OECD and national authorities to promote tax
information exchange but extends this goal much further into enforcement: "Lack of
transparency and a failure to exchange tax information should be vigorously addressed."'
73
In this area, the key target is unregulated off-shore jurisdictions that have played a cen-
tral role in structured finance by providing the SPVs at the heart of most structured trans-
actions in the global markets and often the legal entity at the heart of investment
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at least the same standard of regulation as existed in major financial centers prior to the
crisis.
d. International Cooperation
Under the fourth principle, the G-20 committed to formulate national regulations in a
"consistent manner." 174 In this respect, the G-20 highlighted two aspects: (1) enhance-
ment of cooperation and coordination "across all segments of financial markets, includ-
ing ... cross-border capital flows;" and (2) as a matter of priority, the need to strengthen
crisis prevention, management, and resolution. 175
The two immediate actions are significant. Under the first, supervisors are directed to
"establish supervisory colleges for all major cross-border financial institutions . . . . Major
global banks should meet regularly with their supervisory college for comprehensive dis-
cussions of the firm's activities and assessment of the risks it faces." 76 Under the second,
"[r]egulators should take all steps necessary to strengthen cross-border crisis management
arrangements, including on cooperation and communication with each other and with
appropriate authorities, and develop comprehensive contact lists and conduct simulation
exercises, as appropriate." 77
The two medium-term actions are also of significance. The first requires authorities to
be forward-looking in international regulatory approaches, while the second addresses the
governmental interventions taken during the crisis and their eventual resolution; specifi-
cally, "[a]uthorities should ensure that temporary measures to restore stability and confi-
dence have minimal distortions and are unwound in a timely, well-sequenced and
coordinated manner." 178
e. International financial architecture
Under the fifth principle, the G-20 committed "to advancing the reform of the Bretton
Woods Institutions so that they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights
in the world economy."179 While aspects of the reform of the international financial ar-
chitecture are beyond the scope of the present article, 180 the G-20 highlighted one aspect
of significance for financial regulation: the FSF and other major standard-setting bodies
should review and expand their membership among emerging economies.' 8' Subsequent
to this direction, the FSF, Basel Committee, and IOSCO have all announced membership
expansion. 8 2
174. G-20 Declaration, supra note 133, at 3.
175. Id.
176. G-20 Action Plan, supra note 139, at 4.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 4-5.
179. G-20 Declaration, supra note 133, at 3.
180. For discussion of the international financial architecture and international financial standards, see R.
Weber & D. Arner, Toward a New Design for International Financial Regulation, 29 U. PA. J. Irr'L L. 391
(2008).
181. See G-20 Action Plan, stpra note 139, at 5.
182. See Press Release, FSF, The Financial Stability Forum Decides to Broaden its Membership (Mar. 12,
2009), available at http://www.fsforum.org/press/pr_090312b.pdf (discussed in further detail below); Press
Release, Basel Committee, Expansion of Membership Announced by the Basel Committee (Mar. 13, 2009),
available at http://www.bis.org/press/p090313.htn (Australia, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, and South
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2. Key Tasks and Working Groups
As noted above, the G-20 tasked finance ministers to give highest priority to six areas:
(1) mitigating against procyclicality in regulatory policy; (2) reviewing and aligning global
accounting standards, particularly for complex securities; (3) strengthening the resilience
and transparency of credit derivatives markets and reducing their systemic risks, including
by improving the infrastructure of the OTC markets; (4) reviewing compensation prac-
tices as they relate to incentives for risk taking and innovation; (5) reviewing the interna-
tional financial architecture; and (6) defining the scope of systemically important financial
institutions and determining their appropriate regulation and oversight.183 In addition,
the G-20 established four working groups to meet and report back prior to the April
leaders' meeting: (1) working group 1 on enhancing sound regulation and increasing
transparency (chaired by India and Canada); (2) working group 2 on reinforcing interna-
tional cooperation and promoting integrity in financial markets (chaired by Mexico and
Germany); (3) working group 3 on reforming the IMF (chaired by South Africa and Aus-
tralia); and (4) working group 4 on the World Bank and other multilateral development
banks (MDBs) (chaired by Indonesia and France). In addition, the G-20 deputy finance
ministers and deputy central bank governors were tasked to address macroeconomic coop-
eration, including both growth and negative spillovers. Unlike previous crises, in which
the G-10 was typically tasked to report back via working groups, for the first time, the G-
20 working groups were chaired by both a developed and a developing country member.
C. GROUP OF TwENTY (APRIL 2009)
On April 2, 2009, the G-20 leaders met a second time in London to address issues
relating from the financial crisis and resulting economic crisis. In their communiqu6, 184
the leaders revisited many of the issues discussed in November 2008, stating: "We face the
greatest challenge to the world economy in modem times .. .A global crisis requires a
global solution."ss To address the financial and economic crisis and prevent future crises,
the leaders pledged "to do whatever is necessary" to: (1) restore confidence and growth;
(2) repair the financial system; (3) "strengthen financial regulation to rebuild trust"; (4)
fund and reform the international financial institutions; (5) reject protectionism and pro-
mote global trade and investment; and (6) "build an inclusive, green, and sustainable re-
covery." 186 If the Washington communiqu6 provided the outline of the content of
Korea); Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Technical Committee Invites Brazil, China and India to Join its
Membership, IOSCO Press Release IOSCO/MR/02/002/2009 (Feb. 19, 2009), available at http:/
www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS1 36.pdf.
183. G-20 Declaration, supra note 133, at 4.
184. G-20, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Docu-
ments/final-communique.pdf [hereinafter G-20 Leaders' Statement].
185. Id., 1 2.
186. Id., 1 4. Issues concerning reform of the international financial architecture are beyond the scope of
the current article. For detailed discussion, see Douglas W. Arner & Ross Buckley, Redesigning the Architecture
of the Global Financial System, (AIIFL, Working Paper 7, forthcoming May 2009), available at www.aiifl.com.
See also G-20, Declaration on Delivering Resources through the International Financial Institutions, (Apr. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin Deps-IFI-Annex_Draft 02_04_09 - 1615 Clean.pdf; G-
20, G-20 Working Group 3: Reform of the IMF-Final Report (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/
Documents/g20_wg3_010409.pdf; G-20, G-20 Working Group 4-The World Bank and Other Multilateral
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international financial regulation going forward, the London communique provides the
outline of the system of international financial regulation as well as additional detail re-
garding content. At the same time, details of the reform of the international financial
institutions such as the IMF is left for the next leaders' summit.
1. Leaders' Statement and Financial Regulation
In relation to financial regulation and supervision, the leaders committed to "build a
stronger, more globally consistent, supervisory and regulatory framework for the future
financial sector, which will support sustainable growth and serve the needs of business and
citizens." 187 In this regard, the leaders argued that regulation and supervision must be
designed to: "promote propriety, integrity and transparency; guard against risk across the
financial system; dampen rather than amplify financial and economic cycle; reduce reli-
ance on inappropriately risky sources of financing; and discourage excessive risk-tak-
ing." s88 Regulators and supervisors are tasked to: "[1] protect consumers and investors,
[2] support market discipline, [3] avoid adverse impact on other countries, [4] reduce the
scope for regulatory arbitrage, [5] support competition and dynamism, and [6] keep pace
with innovation. '189
Significantly, the leaders committed to continued implementation of the November Ac-
tion Plan, with substantial progress in all areas relating to financial regulation, 190 and also
extended their commitments in nine major areas, 191 with finance ministers responsible for
implementation and the IMF and FSF / Financial Stability Board monitoring and report-
ing at the next G-20 Finance Ministers' meeting to be held in autumn 2009.192 First, the
G-20 agreed to rename and reconstitute the FSF as the Financial Stability Board (FSB),
including all G-20 countries, FSF members, Spain, and the European Commission. 93 As
discussed further below, this is the foundation of reform of the system of international
financial standards as opposed to their content, the focus of the Washington meeting.
Second, the FSB and JIF were directed "to provide early warning of macroeconomic and
Development Banks: Final Report (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20wg4.
010409.pdf.
187. G-20 Leaders' Statement, sepra note 184, 13.
188. Id., 14.
189. Id.
190. Id., 15. See G-20, Progress Report on the Actions of the Washington Action Plan (Apr. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/FINAL..Anex-onAction-Plan.pdf.
191. G-20 Leaders' Statement, supra note 184, T 15. See also G-20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial
System (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin Deps-Fin-Reg-Annex-020409_-
1615_final.pdf [hereinafter G-20 Financial System Declaration]; G-20, G20 Working Group 1-Enhancing
Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency: Final Report (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/
Documents/g20_wgl_010409.pdf [hereinafter G-20 Working Group 1 Report]; G-20, G20 Working Group on
Reinforcing International Cooperation and Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets (WG2): Final Report (Mar.
2009), available at http:l/www.g20.org/Docunents/g20_-wg2-OlO409.pdf [hereinafter G-20 Working Group
2 Report].
192. G-20 Leaders' Statement, supra note 184, $ 16.
193. Id., $ 15. On Mar. 12, 2009, the FSF announced the expansion of its membership along these lines,
with the inclusion of: Argentina, Brazil, China, the European Commission, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey. Press Release, FSF, Financial Stability Forum
Decides to Broaden its Membership (Mar. 12, 2009), available at http://www.fsforum.org/press/
pr-090312b.pdf.
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financial risks and the actions needed to address them."' 194 Third, the G-20 committed
"to reshape our regulatory systems so that our authorities are able to identify and take
account of macro-prudential risks." 195 Fourth, regulation is to be extended to "all system-
ically important financial institutions, instruments and markets," including systemically
important hedge funds.196 While the first part of this statement is a reiteration of the
agreed approach from November 2008, it is significant that the commitment (and with it,
regulation) has now been explicitly extended to hedge funds.
Fifth, the leaders endorsed the FSF's new principles on pay and compensation 197 and
committed to supporting "sustainable compensation schemes and the corporate social re-
sponsibility of all firms." 198 The result is a globally agreed approach to financial sector
compensation and its regulation-potentially one of the most far-reaching consequences of
the credit crisis. Sixth, in the context of eventual recovery, the leaders agreed to "improve
the quality, quantity, and international consistency of capital," including with regulation
to "prevent excessive leverage and require buffers of resources to be built up in good
times." 199 Seventh, the G-20 committed "to take action against non-cooperative jurisdic-
tions, including tax havens," standing ready "to deploy sanctions to protect our public
finances and financial systems." 200 Eighth, the G-20 called on "accounting standard set-
ters to work urgently with supervisors and regulators to improve standards on valuation
and provisioning and achieve a single set of high-quality global accounting standards."201
Ninth, the G-20 agreed "to extend regulatory oversight and registration to Credit Rating
Agencies to ensure that they meet the international code of good practice." 202 These final
two commitments largely reiterate November commitments but with some reinforce-
ment. In relation to other commitments, an annex to the leaders' statement provides
greater detail.
194. G-20 Leaders' Statement, supra note 184, 1 15.
195. Id.
196. Id. In March 2009, IOSCO released for comment standards for regulation of hedge funds. IOSCO
Technical Committee, Hedge Funds Oversight: Consultation Report (Mar. 2009), available at http://
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD288.pdf.
197. FSF, FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.fsforum.org/
publications/r_0904b.pdf.
198. G-20 Leaders' Statement, supra note 184, T 15.
199. Id.
200. Id. The statement takes a very firm line in this context: "The era of banking secrecy is over." Id. In
this respect, the G-20 "noted" the publication by the OECD of a list of countries assessed by the OECD's
Global Forum on Taxation vis-A-vis international tax information exchange standards. Id. See OECD Global
Forum on Taxation, A Progress Report on the Jurisdictions Surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in Implementing
the Internationally Agreed Tax Standard (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/14/
42497950.pdf.
201. G-20 Leaders' Statement, supra note 184, 15.
202. Id. See IOSCO Technical Committee, Code of Conduct Fundamental for Credit Rating Agencies (May
2008), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD271.pdf; IOSCO Technical Commit-
tee, International Cooperation in Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies-Note (Mar. 2009), available at http:/l
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD287.pdf; IOSCO Technical Committee, A Review of Imple-
mentation of the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies (Mar. 2009), available at http://
www.iosco.orglibrary/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD286.pdf. See also Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Update on
Progress Made in Addressing G-20 Concerns, IOSCO Media Statement IOSCO/MS/05/2009 (Apr. 3, 2009),
available at http://www.ioseo.org/library/statements/pdf/statements-5.pdf.
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2. G-20 Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System
In one of two annexes to the G-20 Leaders' Statement, the G-20 provided additional
detail in respect of their major commitments in the area of financial regulation. 203 Specif-
ically, the G-20 Financial System Declaration provides additional detail in eight major
areas:204 (1) Financial Stability Board, (2) international cooperation, (3) prudential regula-
tion, (4) scope of regulation, (5) compensation, (6) tax havens and non-cooperative juris-
dictions, (7) accounting standards,2 05 and (8) credit rating agencies. 206
a. Financial Stability Board
As noted above, the G-20 leaders agreed to reconstitute the FSF as the FSB. According
to the G-20 Financial System Declaration, the FSB will:
[1] assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system, [and] identify and oversee re-
quired actions; [2] promote co-ordination and information exchange among authori-
ties responsible for financial stability; [3] monitor and advise on market developments
and their implications for regulatory policy; [4] advise on and monitor best practice in
meeting regulatory standards; [5] undertake joint strategic reviews of the policy de-
velopment work of the international Standard Setting Bodies [such as the Basel Com-
mittee, IOSCO, etc.] to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, focused on
priorities, and addressing [any] gaps; [6] set guidelines for, and support the establish-
ment, functioning of, and participation in, supervisory colleges, including through
ongoing identification of the most systemically important [cross-border] firms; [7]
support contingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with
respect to systemically important firms; and [8] collaborate with the IMF to conduct
Early Warning Exercises to identify and report to the IMF's International Monetary
and Financial Committee and the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Gover-
nors on the build up of macroeconomic and financial risks and the actions needed to
address them.2 07
In turn, FSB members, subject to FSB elaboration and reporting, commit to: (1) "pur-
sue the maintenance of financial stability;" (2) "enhance the openness and transparency of
the financial sector;" (3) "implement international financial standards"; and (4) "agree to
undergo periodic peer reviews." 20 8
203. The G-20 Financial System Declaration, supra note 191, is largely based on analysis and recommenda-
tions contained in the G-20 Working Group 2 report, supra note 191.
204. G-20 Financial System Declaration, supra note 191.
205. Discussion of accounting standards in the G-20 Financial System Declaration is largely identical to that
in the G-20 Leaders' Statement and will not be discussed in further detail below.
206. Discussion of credit rating agencies in the G-20 Financial System Declaration is largely identical to that
in the G-20 Leaders' Statement and will not be discussed in further detail below.
207. G-20 Financial System Declaration, supra note 191, at 1. See Press Release, FSF, Financial Stability
Forum Re-established as the Financial Stability Board (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.fsforum.org/
press/pr_090402b.pdf. For detailed discussion, see Michael Taylor & Douglas W. Amer, The Financial Stabil-
ity Board: Hardening the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation?, (AIIFL, Working Paper 6, forthcoming
Apr. 2009), available at www.aiifl.com.
208. G-20 Financial System Declaration, supra note 191, at 1.
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b. International Cooperation
In relation to international cooperation, the G-20 leaders agreed:
[1] to establish the remaining supervisory colleges for significant cross-border firms
by June 2009, building on the 28 already in place; [2] to implement the FSF princi-
ples for cross-border crisis management immediately,0 9 and that home authorities of
each major international financial institution should ensure that the group of authori-
ties with a common interest in that financial institution meet at least annually; [3] to
support continued efforts by the IMF, FSB, World Bank, and [Basel Committee] to
develop an international framework for cross-border bank resolution arrangements;
[4] the importance of further work and international cooperation on the subject of
exit strategies; and [5] that the IMF and FSB should together launch an Early Warn-
ing Exercise at the 2009 Spring Meetings of the IMF.210
In this context, the most significant element is the increased focus on mechanisms to
address failure of financial institutions operating on a cross-border basis-a problem that is
not easy to solve and one that will probably require significant time and effort to agree any
sort of workable approach. 2 11
c. Prudential Regulation
In respect of prudential regulation, the G-20 made eight specific commitments, with
four of these addressing capital. Specifically, until economic recovery becomes certain,
the current 8 percent minimum international capital adequacy ratio standard will remain
unchanged. 2 12 In addition, capital levels above that level "should be allowed to decline to
facilitate lending" as required in the context of poor economic conditions. 2 13 "[O]nce
recovery is assured, prudential regulatory standards should be strengthened," however,
specifically with capital requirements above the current minimum standards and also (re-
turning to the reality that in the context of the crisis, equity capital has become far more
important) that "the quality of capital should be enhanced." 2 14 Significantly, the G-20
also committed to implementation of Basel II: "all G-20 countries should progressively
adopt the Basel II capital framework," although in a revised form reflecting experiences
and lessons of the credit crisis.2 15
209. See FSF, FSF Principles for Cross-Border Cooperation on Crisis Management (Apr. 2009), available at http://
www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0904c.pdf.
210. G-20 Financial System Declaration, supra note 191, at 2.
211. For discussion of related issues, see Douglas Arner & Joseph Norton, Building a Framework to Address
Failure of Complex Global Financial Institutions, HONG KONG L. J. (forthcoming 2009).
212. G-20 Financial System Declaration, supra note 191, at 2.
213. Id.
214. Id. The Basel Committee is directed to develop guidelines for harmonization of the definition of capi-
tal by the end 2009 and to review minimum levels of capital and develop recommendations in 2010. Id. See
Press Release, Basel Committee, Initiatives on Capital Announced by the Basel Committee (Mar. 12, 2009).
215. G-20 Financial System Declaration, supra note 191, at 2. See Basel Committee, Revisions to the Basel II
Market Risk Framework (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl48.htm; Basel Committee,
Guidelines for Computing Capital for Incremental Risk in the Trading Book (Jan. 2009), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl49.htm; Basel Committee, Proposed Enhancements to the Basel 11 Frame-work (Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs 50.htm.
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Beyond capital, the FSB, the Basel Committee, the BIS Committee on the Global Fi-
nancial System, and the IASB are tasked to implement recommendations to address pro-
cyclicality by end 2009.216 Further, in addition to capital and aspects of procyclicality, for
the first time the G-20 committed to "a simple, transparent, non-risk based measure
which is internationally comparable, properly takes into account off-balance sheet expo-
sures, and can help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking system," essentially a
leverage ratio to restrict overall leverage across the financial system.217 Returning to
themes relating to securitization from the November statement, the Basel Committee is
tasked to develop a framework by 2010 to improve "incentives for risk management of
securitization, including considering due diligence and quantitative retention require-
ments." 218 Finally, in addition to capital and leverage standards, the G-20 committed to a
new liquidity standard, with the Basel Committee tasked to develop "by 2010 a global
framework for promoting stronger liquidity buffers at financial institutions, including
cross-border institutions." 219
d. Scope of Regulation
Following the November 2008 G-20 Declaration agreeing all systemically important
financial institutions, markets and instruments be subject to appropriate regulation, in
April 2009, the G-20 Financial System Declaration provides a much greater level of detail.
Specifically, the April Declaration includes eight aspects. First, regulatory systems will be
reformed "to ensure authorities are able to identify and take account of macro-prudential
risks across the financial system including in the case of regulated banks, shadow banks,
and private pools of capital to limit the build up of systemic risk," with the FSB, BIS and
international standard setters tasked to develop specific "macro-prudential tools" and re-
port by autumn 2009.220 Second, a statement that "large and complex financial institu-
tions require particularly careful oversight given their systemic importance." 22 1 While
seemingly self-evident, this reflects an important shift in emphasis from the pre-crisis (in
which such firms were viewed as better able to address the risks they faced than regulators)
to the post-crisis period (in which financial institutions', especially large financial institu-
tions, internal risk management systems will be closely monitored by regulators). In sup-
port of this, G-20 national regulators will have the powers necessary to gather "relevant
information on all material financial institutions, markets, and instruments in order to
assess the potential for their failure or severe stress to contribute to systemic risk." 222 In
addition, "in order to prevent regulatory arbitrage, the IMF and the FSB will produce
guidelines for national authorities to assess whether a financial institution, market, or an
instrument is systemically important by the next" G-20 finance ministers and central bank
governors meeting in autumn 2009.223
216. See FSF, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System (Apr.
2009), available at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r 0904a.pdf.
217. G-20 Financial System Declaration, supra note 191, at 2.
218, Id.
219, Id. at 3. See Basel Committee, Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision (Sep.
2008), available at http://www.bis.org/pub!/bcbsl44.pdf.noframes=l.
220. G-20 Financial System Declaration, supra note 191, at 3.
221. Id. For discussion, see Arner & Norton, supra note 211.
222. G-20 Financial System Declaration, supra note 191, at 3.
223. Id.
VOL. 43, NO. 1
GLOBAL CREDIT CRISIS 2008 133
Beyond traditionally systemically significant firms, as noted above, "hedge funds or
their managers will be registered and will be required to disclose appropriate information
on an ongoing basis to supervisors or regulators, including on their leverage, necessary for
assessment of the systemic risks that they pose individually or collectively." 224 At the same
time, supervisors will require "institutions which have hedge funds as their counterparties
have effective risk management," including "mechanisms to monitor the funds' leverage
and set limits for single counterparty exposures." 225 In relation to credit derivatives,
"standardisation and resilience of credit derivatives markets, in particular through the es-
tablishment of central clearing counterparties subject to effective regulation and supervi-
sion," will be promoted with industry tasked to "develop an action plan on standardisation
by autumn 2009."226 Finally, in relation to keeping pace with future innovation, G-20
members "will each review and adapt the boundaries of the regulatory framework regu-
larly to keep pace with developments in the financial system and promote good practices
and consistent approaches at the international level. ' 227
e. Compensation
As noted above, the G-20 April communiqu6 contained a strong commitment on com-
pensation, which has been supported by the release of related principles from the FSF.
According to the G-20 and the FSF, the principles require: "firms' boards of directors to
play an active role in the design, operation, and evaluation of compensation schemes;
compensation arrangements, including bonuses, to properly reflect risk and the timing
and composition of payments to be sensitive to the time horizon of risks," with payments
not finalized "over short periods where risks are realised over long periods; and firms to
publicly disclose clear, comprehensive, and timely information about compensation" to
stakeholders, including shareholders." 228 Significantly, the G-20 committed that national
supervisors implement the principles in order to be effective for 2009 compensation ar-
rangements, with the Basel Committee integrating the principles into guidance by autumn
2009, with supervisors assessing firm compensation and inventing as necessary. 229
f. Tax Havens and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions
Building on statement from November, the G-20 made strong commitments regarding
tax havens in the April 2009 communiquE. In respect of actions, the G-20 Financial Sys-
tem Declaration includes a "toolbox" of six measures:
[1] increased disclosure requirements on the part of taxpayers and financial institu-
tions to report transactions involving non-cooperative jurisdictions; [2] withholding
taxes in respect of a wide variety of payments; [3] denying deductions in respect of
expense payments to payees resident in a non-cooperative jurisdiction; [4] reviewing




227. Id. at 4.
228. Id.; FSF, Compensation Principles, supra note 197.
229. G-20 Financial System Declaration, supra note 191, at 4.
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to review their investment policies; and, [6] giving extra weight to the principles of
tax transparency and information exchange when designing bilateral aid programs. 230
In addition to tax haven issues, the G-20 Financial Systems Declaration also tasks the
FSB and IMF to develop a similar mechanism for international prudential regulatory stan-
dards.23' This latter indicates that the existing system of international financial standards
for the first time will be given an effective enforcement mechanism based on those previ-
ously used in the context of money laundering and now tax havens.
V. Conclusion
Preventing and addressing systemic risk is the fundamental aspect of financial regula-
tory design. Such design requires the following elements to be addressed: first, a robust
financial infrastructure (especially payment and settlement systems); second, well managed
financial institutions with effective corporate governance and risk management systems;
third, disclosure requirements sufficient to support market discipline; fourth, regulatory
systems designed to reinforce management and market discipline as well as limiting and
monitoring potential risks across all financial institutions; fifth, a lender of last resort to
provide liquidity to financial institutions on an appropriate basis; sixth, mechanisms for
resolving problem institutions; and seventh, mechanisms to protect financial services con-
sumers in the event of financial institution failure. 232
First, in relation to infrastructure, the central weakness exposed by the crisis has been in
relation to the current bilateral structure of OTC derivatives transactions. In this context,
the bilateral structure resulted in counterparty risks that were not adequately addressed
either by market participants or regulators.
Second, in relation to financial institution corporate governance, in contrast to the ex-
pectations of former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, 233 financial institutions
did not well manage their own risks or businesses. This failure is certainly one that was
central in the credit crisis.
Third, disclosure requirements were not sufficient to support transparency and market
discipline. In fact, systemic risks arose due to asymmetric information-essentially, weak-
nesses in transparency and disclosure. Such issues are characteristic of the highly complex
structured products that acted as the transmission mechanisms of the excesses preceding
the crisis and adverse selection issues during the crisis. The activities of rating agencies
exacerbated such issues both prior to and during the crisis.234
Fourth, in relation to prudential regulation, in most cases, systemic risk did not arise
from areas that were the subject of regulatory responsibility. Rather, in most cases, risks
arose primarily from areas that were largely unregulated. Examples include mortgage
broker activities, off-balance sheet activities of banks and securities firms, OTC deriva-
230. Id. at 4-5.
231. Id. at 5.
232. See generally Amer, supra note 49. For an alternate view of systemic risk, see S. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk,
97 GEo. L.J. 193 (2008).
233. Hearing on the Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators Before the H. Comm. of Government on
Oversight & Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Dr. Alan Greenspan, former Chairmain,
U.S. Federal Reserve Board), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081023100438.pdf.
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tives, and non-traditional activities of insurance companies. In these cases, risks often
arose from regulatory arbitrage-financial firms actively moving activities outside of regu-
lated areas. In addition, such regulatory arbitrage was in many cases made possible by the
splintering of financial regulation in the United States and the European Union across a
large number of regulators, with individual regulators usually less concerned about activi-
ties falling outside of the scope of their major responsibilities. In addition, systemic risks
arose due to improperly designed prudential regulatory standards, especially in relation to
capital, liquidity, and leverage.
Fifth, systemic risk arose due to the lack of appropriate mechanisms to deal with
problems that arose from unregulated or unexpected sources. Examples include the ne-
cessity of rescuing AIG and also the lack of a mechanism for appropriately resolving the
Lehman Brothers crisis. In particular, not only are systems required to deal with banks
(especially those of systemic significance), but also needed are mechanisms capable of
dealing with non-banks and/or financial conglomerates.
Finally, consumer protection structures, such as deposit insurance, did not meet the
realities of major financial systems in the context of a serious financial crisis and had to be
extended to new areas (businesses and money markets) in order to prevent both bank runs
and new forms of bank run-like withdrawals from core funding areas of the financial
system.
As noted above, preventing and addressing systemic risk is the fundamental aspect of
financial regulatory design. In looking forward, the global credit crisis of 2008 highlights
the urgent need to redesign both the global and domestic financial regulatory systems not
only to properly address systemic risk but also to support its proper functioning (i.e. finan-
cial stability). At the same time, financial regulatory design should extend beyond ad-
dressing systemic risk to broader concerns of financial stability. 235 Schinasi provides the
most comprehensive definition of financial stability:
Financial stability is a situation in which the financial system is capable of satisfacto-
rily performing its three key functions simultaneously. First, the financial system is
efficiently and smoothly facilitating the intertemporal allocation of resources from
savers to investors and the allocation of economic resources generally. Second, for-
ward-looking financial risks are being assessed and priced reasonably accurately and
are being relatively well managed. Third, the financial system is in such condition
that it can comfortably if not smoothly absorb financial and real economic surprises
and shocks. 236
This definition implies that the objective is:
maintaining the smooth functioning of the financial system and maintaining the sys-
tem's ability to facilitate and support the efficient functioning and performance of the
economy; and having in place the mechanisms to prevent financial problems from
becoming systemic or from threatening the stability of the financial and economic
system, but without undermining the economy's ability to sustain growth and per-
form its other important functions.237
235. See Arner, supra note 49.
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This definition thus extends beyond crisis prevention and addressing systemic risk to
support for financial development and thereby, directly or indirectly, economic growth.
The plan outlined by the G-20 and being implemented by the FSB and others provides
a significant comprehensive outline of the major issues that are to be addressed in this
respect. At the same time, the plan does not provide a significant amount of guidance in
respect of the future of finance. As demonstrated by the role of regulation in the global
credit crisis of 2008, financial regulation plays a central role in the structure of finance,
financial institutions, and financial transactions.
While the eventual outlines are unclear, a number of implications appear certain. First,
policymakers will focus on enhancing the linkage between finance and the real economy,
thus reducing the financialization that became characteristic of global finance in the years
immediately preceding the crisis. In broad terms, finance will become less significant in
the global economy. At the same time, there is likely to be a divergent approach between
individual jurisdictions, with some jurisdictions determining that financial institutions will
not be allowed to fail. The corollary of this approach is restrictive regulation in terms of
products and activities. Other jurisdictions will continue to allow a more permissive ap-
proach to finance, and it is these jurisdictions that eventually will emerge as the major
global financial centers. Second, for at least a number of years, financial institutions and
transaction structures will become significantly less complex and significantly more trans-
parent. While securitization and covered bond structures should return, the more com-
plex products such as CDO squareds are likely not to become common again in the
foreseeable future. Financial institutions themselves will also become significantly less
complex. These two factors will significantly reduce the role of off-shore jurisdictions,
except to the extent that global finance moves to these centers due to the restrictive versus
permissive divergence highlighted above. Third, unregulated portions of the financial
system will become regulated, with the focus on OTC derivatives and hedge funds. The
former are likely to move increasingly to central counterparty structures or exchange-
based platforms, while the latter will face increased disclosure requirements and leverage
restrictions. In this context, individual jurisdictions will reform domestic financial struc-
tures along lines appropriate to the activities they will permit within their respective finan-
cial systems. The highest profile example of regulatory structure reform will likely be the
United States; significant structural changes are also likely in the countries of the Euro-
pean Union that have adopted the euro as a common currency.23 8 For off-shore jurisdic-
tions, this reform will mean that even if they continue to adopt a more permissive
approach, they will be forced to meet minimum international regulatory and transparency
standards emanating from the FSB. Fourth, quantitative finance, especially risk modeling,
will receive much less regulatory trust. This decrease in trust will extend not only to
rating agencies and their models but also has important implications for the future of
financial education and the requirements of financial institutions and regulatory agencies.
Finally, as a result of cooperative efforts, international cooperation and related institu-
tional structures will have an increasing role, either as a result of a continued mandate for
economic and financial globalization or as a result of any possible decision to limit the role
of global finance.
238. See THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN TIE EU, REPORT (Feb. 2009), availa-
ble at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/finances/docs/de-larosierereport-en.pdf; Turner Review, supra
note 6.
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